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

ST. CHARLES
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CARTHAGENA

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE U.S. BISHOPS

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Wilson C. McWilliams **WILL RED CHINA INTERVENE?** • ***Michael Novak & Robert McAfee Brown*** **PIGSKIN ECUMENISM** • ***John Noonan*** **BIRTH CONTROL & THE POPE'S CONSCIENCE** • ***Harvey Cox and William Shannon*** **HOW GREAT IS LBJ?** • ***Donald D. Ranstead*** **HOW FREE IS FREI?** • ***Sidney Lens*** **REUTHER versus MEANY** • ***Jay Case*** **PAIN IN SPAIN** •

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NEWS AND VIEWS

Doesn't the Pope read Triumph?

"Is birth control a sexual perversion? That is the question, plainly answered in the affirmative by the whole tradition of the Church . . . The only *real* alternative, intellectually and popularly, to the difficult but logical position of the Church is the Playboy philosophy: the idea that absolutely everything is permissible (except chastity)."

Editorial in *Triumph* magazine

•

Pax Romana Journal, the publication of the International Movement of Catholic Students, suggests the following as a creed for Catholic conservatives:

"I believe in the myth of the Christian West, which revealed itself chiefly in the Crusades and the Inquisition. I believe that the Church has never meddled in politics before the adventure of the worker-priests; that the Council had two main objectives: to repeat what has always been said and to define the dogma of the *status quo*; that there are two sources of revelation: the encyclicals and our interpretations. I believe that the Roman curia is a divine institution and that the apostolic college is an ecclesiastical institution; that the Syllabus of Errors was written after *Pacem in Terris;* that it is heretical to take the historical context into account when interpreting an encyclical; that the priestly character is not engraved in the priest's heart, but sewn onto his cassock; that a delation to Rome, preferably anonymous, is the sign of an authentic Christian and of a free and courageous man; that Marxism is intrinsically wicked, but that Stalin's methods were extrinsically good; that the truth is not to be sought but defended. I believe in the primacy of the letter over the spirit, of abstractions over real life, of fear over liberty, and of institutions over people."

•

Civilian deaths in Vietnam:

According to the U.S. government, the Viet Cong killed 1,703 civilians during 1966 (see *U.S. News & World Report* for January 16th). How many did U.S. forces kill? Well, no such ready estimate has come out of Washington, though many newsmen have been hunting for information, and no one has been able to explain how we know the Viet Cong's score so accurately without having any idea about our own. Last April, General Westmoreland claimed we had accidentally killed a grand total of 137 civilians in the South—which was accepted as the howler of the month. There are unofficial estimates that we are killing from two to twelve civilians for every member of the VC killed. A more conservative estimate came from the Associated Press on December 22: "Figures from Vietnamese and American public and private sources indicate that this year's civilian death toll has averaged about 1,000 a month." This would mean 12,000 for the year 1966, or seven times as many as the U.S. attributes to the Viet Cong.

•

From "Is St. John's Burning?", an editorial in the student newspaper *The Torch,* at St. John's University in New York:

"St. John's is the academic world's answer to World War II Paris. The students of this university are surrounded by both an administration that has with alarming irregularity acted tyrannically and irrationally and an allied group which seeks to end the tyranny. Quotes from both sides make it readily apparent that either is ready to invade or destroy the university and burn it to the ground rather than forsake its principles.

"There is an underground. Many of its members were fired—academically executed—others left and still others remain, hoping and begging for change. The Allies—the UFCT (United Federation of College Teachers) the AAUP (American Association of University Professors) and Middle States (the accrediting agency)—will invade this University and destroy it if, at the very least, the teachers dismissed last December are not granted the hearings they deserve. And although we do not want to see destruction, we cannot really blame them . . . What is uglier and more dangerous is the refusal of the government of St. John's to protect its city by granting the hearings and ending the war. . . ."

•

Wretched excess:

Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, when asked by the press what he thought of Jacqueline Grennan and the announced secularization of Webster College, first said "No comment," and then added: "On the whole, I prefer Nathan Hales to Benedict Arnolds."

•

Father Gommar DePauw, who began his Catholic Traditionalist Movement with regular reference to "our beloved spiritual leaders, the Catholic bishops of the United States," has since learned to apportion that love more sparingly. Lately he said that several bishops had "better stand up and let us know . . . are they Roman Catholic bishops or are they forming an American Catholic [i.e., schismatic] Church?" The DePauw list of far-out bishops includes Archbishops Dearden, Hallinan and McGucken, and Bishops Reed, Furey and Buswell.

•

A survey by *Consumer Reports* suggests that there's at least a 2-to-1 chance that your local TV repairman is a crook. The magazine called in 20 different repairmen from the New York area to fix 20 different TV sets, which were in technically perfect condition except that one small tube was burnt out. Three of the repairmen were unquestionably honest—they simply replaced the tube and charged about $8 for a home call, including the cost of the new tube ($2). The 17 others (three of them, perhaps with cause) overcharged by 150 to 300 percent, some of them unnecessarily replacing tubes, bringing the sets into the shop for further unnecessary repairs, charging for "tuning," etc. The bills of this group average $20.95—a 250 percent overcharge.

JOHN LEO

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CORRESPONDENCE

Humoresque

Helena, Mont.

To the Editors: Is it terribly difficult to find a woman intellectual in the Church with a sense of humor? Or maybe the whole article, "The Woman Intellectual and the Church," is delightfully humorous? MARION WARD

Disarmament

New Haven, Conn.

To the Editors: It was a great pleasure to read Wilson Carey McWilliams' incisive piece, "Ending the Cold War" (Jan. 6). One additional comment is in order, however, with reference to the possibility of an international agreement not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. McWilliams concentrates on the risks of such a "no-first-use" agreement to the United States, especially insofar as we may be engaged in limited wars (which will perhaps be more easy to keep limited if our threat to use nuclear weapons is credible). I would suggest that the implications of such an agreement for our European allies are far more important.

A "no-first-use" agreement would have two unfortunate effects in Europe. First, it would render obsolete the entire strategy on which NATO has been based; since NATO's land forces have long been below strength, the alliance has militarily depended on the credible threat that we would respond to a Soviet attack on Europe with limited—or perhaps even all-out—nuclear warfare. The myth of defending Europe against all-out conventional attack would thus be totally exposed (and with it the political inferiority we impose on our allies under the cover of "integrated command and control" in NATO).

The second consequence of a "no-first-use" treaty follows directly from the first. Since France and Great Britain (not to mention West Germany) feel exposed without a credible nuclear deterrent, Paris—and perhaps London as well—would be tempted not to sign the agree-

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AN OPEN LETTER TO THE U. S. BISHOPS

Robert McAfee Brown, professor of religion at Stanford and regular columnist for Commonweal, wrote this letter February 3, after returning from the recent Vietnam mobilization held in Washington January 31 and February 1.

Your Excellencies:

This week over 2500 Christian and Jewish clergy gathered in Washington for a two-day mobilization on "Vietnam: The Clergyman's Dilemma." We engaged in corporate worship, we heard speeches by Senators and Sulpicians, we talked to Congressmen, we participated in workshops, we conducted a dignified vigil in front of the White House, we conversed with representatives of the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House staff, and we pledged ourselves to work harder to help our nation find a way out of the Vietnam war.

Working with us were priests and nuns, ministers and rabbis, seminarians and laymen, Methodist bishops and Episcopal bishops. But no Roman Catholic bishops. Not one.

We missed you.

We had hoped that the mobilization would be a focal point at which the entire American religious community could make a common witness that all of us deplore the slaughter and the killing and the destruction that Vietnam has come to represent, and that all of us together, without presuming to offer cheap and easy panaceas, could lay more directly on the conscience of the nation and on our own consciences the absolute necessity of finding a way to initiate negotiations. We had hoped from the start to make this a witness that would count for something, because it would include substantial representation not only from the rank and file, but from the leadership of the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish communities.

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We needed you.

The immediate impact of the mobilization was great, and it will continue to be felt as the priests and rabbis and ministers return to their own communities and seek to build fires under the dulled consciences of the American churches and synagogues. But its impact could have been far greater, had we been able to number you among our ranks, had we had significant indication that you too support our burning desire to mobilize the conscience of the nation, and to enlist the hearts and minds of the members of our churches and synagogues in creating a public climate receptive to American initiatives for a negotiated peace.

The original call for the mobilization was widely publicized in the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious journals. There were advertisements, news stories and editorial comments for many weeks preceeding the mobilization itself. The word was out. But as the day of the mobilization approached, and not a single Roman Catholic bishop had responded, the Executive Committee of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam sent telegrams to all 250 of you, pointing out the vacuum in Roman Catholic episcopal representation, and urging you to give the mobilization both your approval and your presence. It is understandable that many of you would be unable to adjust your schedules so as to attend. But most of you, surely, could have found time at least to respond to our importunate invitation to attend. And yet only 11 of you even acknowledged our request. Those of you who did, supported the mobilization in your replies, and at least one of you graciously provided funds for a priest and nun to attend in his place.

But what of the other 239? How are we to interpret your almost total silence? What reading are we to put on the unwillingness of some of you even to let your dioceses be represented? Do you disapprove of a meeting for peace as thoroughly as your silence would indicate? Is it the Vietnam issue that disturbs you, or is it the ecumenical aspect that disturbs you? Had you been at our meetings, you would have found that one of the individuals most frequently appealed to was your own Bishop of Rome. We Protestants and Jews have tried to take our lead from him, and we were sad that his own fellow bishops would not do likewise. In the position paper presented to the mobilization, we quoted from your own statement of last November, in which you reminded yourselves that it is "our duty to magnify the moral voice of our nation." But the religious communities cannot afford the luxury of doing so one by one. Such unilateral actions will increasingly become frivolous if not immoral in the face of the immensity of the task that confronts us.

As we talked to Senators, Representatives, and other men in public life, it became clearer and clearer to us that time is running out on the question of Vietnam. Either we are going to persuade our policy-makers that they must find a way to initiate negotiations, or we are going to discover that we have gone so far on a policy of military escalation that there will be no turning back.

So we needed you in Washington, and we regret your absence there.

But we need you even more now. The Washington mobilization is behind us; the climactic decisions of the next few months lie ahead of us. As we stated at Washington, "Our task is not to assign blame for the past, but to accept responsibility for the future." It is our conviction that there are millions of Americans, many of them Roman Catholics, who have not yet thought their way through to a clear-cut moral stand on Vietnam, and that it is high time all of our religious communities gave this subject top priority in the ongoing life of their congregations. So we ask you to join us in fostering discussion in the churches and synagogues—and much more than that, placing upon all Americans the imperative to assure our policy-makers, by every means available, that we repudiate the concept of "victory" achieved at increasingly terrible cost, and that we support American initiatives to bring about negotiations that will end the fighting and initiate the rebuilding of a land and people we have despoiled.

If the religious communities of our nation cannot rise to this challenge in the months ahead, we can rightly be accused not only of irresponsibility but of immorality. Perhaps the word we Americans most need to hear, before it is too late, is a prophetic word that Albert Camus, a non-Christian, addressed to Christians in France after World War II:

"What the world expects of Christians is that Christians should speak out, loud and clear, and that they should voice their condemnation in such a way that never a doubt, never the slightest doubt, could rise in the heart of the simplest man. That they should get away from abstraction and confront the blood-stained face history has taken on today." (*Resistance, Rebellion and Death*)

Our own share of responsibility for that blood-stained face must increasingly haunt us. For, as our Washington

Next Week

Father Joseph Walsh, CSP, discussing recent books on sex and the college student:

"I can say after a careful reading of these studies that my own experience, and that of my fellow campus ministers, is confirmed: students approach sex as a moral matter, i.e., as an area of serious responsibility and concern. The image of large numbers of college students 'sleeping around,' indiscriminately indulging in sex for kicks and pleasure without any concern for consequences or permanence appears to reflect more the frustrated yearnings of writers and readers than it does actual campus life."

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statement concluded, "We who are so deeply involved in the immensity of the present war, must have the courage to initiate the steps that will lead to peace. If we do not take those steps, we firmly believe that God will judge us harshly, and will hold us accountable for the horror we continue to unleash. But if we do turn about, if we seek to undo whatever measure we can of the wrong that has been done, then we also firmly believe that as we walk that long and hard and often discouraging road, God himself will be with us, to guide and chasten and sustain us, and that he will deign to use even us in restoring some portion of the divine creation we have so grieviously misused."

In nomine Christi. ROBERT MC AFEE BROWN

How Free Is Frei?

Santiago

"The Senate decision [denying permission to the Santiago Chief Executive to visit Washington] is undoubtedly the culmination of a process [of obstruction] which began the same day in which the people elected me President and I first sent proposals to the National Congress." When Chilean President Eduardo Frei made this assertion to the throng in front of *La Moneda* (Chile's White House) the evening of January 19, it was greeted with cries of assent. This country's Senate, which had made its remarkable and unprecedented decision two days before, is a classic instance of a "lame duck" legislature, with half of its members hold-overs from the 1961 elections. The ruling Christian Democratic Party (PDC) correctly contends that it no longer represents the people, who in the elections of September, 1964 and again in March of 1965 and 1966 gave a clear mandate to the President to carry out his *"Revolución en Libertad."* As the PDC and Marxist Left maintain, the crisis here is an institutional one and not simply of a political character. Interestingly, *La Nación,* the government paper, compares the Senate-Executive impasse with the constitutional crisis which afflicted the U.S. 30 years ago when the Supreme Court rejected the legislation of the New Deal.

It is important that North Americans realize that it was not only the Socialists and Communists, the same parties which had given conservative ex-President Jorge Alessandri permission to visit the U.S. five years ago, who blocked the departure of Sr. Frei. Actually even this time the Communists were undecided as to how to vote almost until the last minute. Nor was the Senate action a result of that platitudinous formula U.S. liberals evoke on such occasions: It is both the extreme Right and the extreme Left which frustrate the moderate progressives. It was, in fact, precisely the incredibly opportunistic Center (*Radicales*) whose hesitant 8 votes decided the matter. (It is significant that the rank and file in the PDC have demonstrated more hostility towards the *Radicales* and *Nacionales* [Right] than towards the Left since the vote.) It is pleasing for Chileans to note that Senator Mike Mansfield grasped that the Senate rejection involved more (and less) than "ideology." His tactful message to his Chilean counterparts and to President Frei was quoted by the latter in his January 19 address.

There were a number of subterfuges that Sr. Frei might have employed to get around the Senate's opposition and to defiantly leave for the Johnson talks as scheduled. This is especially the case as he knew, and most of us here in Santiago sensed, that the average Chilean took a dim view of the unprecedented Senate veto. Chileans are by tradition and temperament constitutionalists and firm believers in legal process and, therefore, the President's proposed Constitutional Reform is supported by almost everyone. Briefly, the Amendment would give the President the right—once during his term of office—to call for general elections to replace both branches of the Congress. Even the reluctant *Radicales* and *Nacionales* have had to support the proposal. Thus, Chile will be experiencing new nation-wide elections sometime in the next four months (the Amendment says within 60 to 90 days) and the PDC its greatest test in its 30-year old history.

Meanwhile the U.S. will miss the opportunity to hear Chile's democratic and progressive counterpart to Brazil's President-elect who visited Washington the end of January. As U.S. experts have stated during the past year, the "string-bean Republic" is the leader of Latin America in carrying out the reforms ennunciated at Punte del Este in 1961. This spirit has led not only the U.S. to give to Chile more per-capita aid than any other country south of the Rio Grande but made it the region's largest beneficiary (after Cuba, of course) of Soviet technical assistance and loans. Its finances are in such shape that it is the *only* Latin American country to receive a

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British loan in recent years. President Frei might, also, have told the U.S. Congress and Harvard audiences that his country spends five times as much on education as on its military and that very soon it will be the only Latin American country with a land reform law which fullfills both *Alianza* and F.A.O. criteria as being *serious*. Both Chile and Brazil had an annual rate of inflation of 40% in 1964. Two years later, prices in Brazil continue rising at the same rate while in Chile it is now 17%. Even in monetary matters one can discern the difference in results between the *Revolución en Libertad* and a *golpe* of generals.

The immediate hemispheric effects of the Senate action are becoming clear: an accentuated isolation of Chile in southern South America, surrounded as she is by ambitious military regimes, and a likely postponement of the projected April meeting of O.A.S. heads of state. The absence from such a meeting of the head of the Latin American country which is the most vigorous in fighting for regional economic integration as well as *Alianza* goals would be ludicrous. Today the anxiety of many Chileans as to the effect abroad of the Senate veto was perhaps best expressed in a cartoon in Chile's leading daily. The cartoon figure says nervously: "Abroad they will think that we Chileans are Reds when we are only red in the face."

DONALD D. RANSTEAD

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

'ANOTHER VIETNAM'

When the United States helps a small ally, especially an ally which flanks Vietnam, it arrives not only with money, arms, seaports, highways, jet airports, and with airconditioning, wives, children and schools, but with parakeets, ukeleles and waterskis as well. In Bangkok one quickly learns that the Thais are pleased and a little dazed about it all, and that they also are uneasy over the implications of this American involvement. This fact already has penetrated the American administrative nervous system. Every American in Bangkok has something to say about the potentially disruptive effects of the United States presence. We must be more sensitive, they say—less abrasive, more adroit, more intelligent, more aware.

Also, the official Americans nearly all think that we should be doing more in Thailand—that we need to expand our programs, get into the northeast in a bigger way, make Thai officials and peasants alike more aware of the "big picture." Almost the only Americans who think that we might do less are a few old hands. And while their arguments trouble other officials, they generally are held to have gone-native, or to lack geo-political realism. In any event, it is clear enough that these people have lost the argument; and they admit it.

While the present scale of our presence in Thailand is mostly a result of the war in Vietnam, and supports that war, the attention of the American official community in Bangkok is on Thailand, not Vietnam. Thailand is experiencing trouble in its northeastern provinces bordering on Laos, where Laos is a narrow neck separating Thailand from Vietnam. Here, the fear is, there are the beginnings of a rebellion which some believe could eventually make Thailand "another Vietnam."

I qualify that last sentence so heavily because I am skeptical, but also because the Americans in Bangkok don't know. A short visit to Bangkok can produce no independent evidence on the matter but it does allow conversations with Americans who ought to know the problem. Yet the most interesting result of a recent visit is that American officials not only are unsure about what really is going on in the northeast but readily concede their ignorance. There is no consistent story on what ought to be done. Our growing involvement in Thai affairs is far more a result of doctrinal assumptions in Washington and the momentum of government than a considered response to evidence of a problem. Thailand is in a vulnerable geographical situation and it is an ally; it reports trouble and our enemies issue threats against it; the response is to send missions and officials, and the *raison d'être* of missions and officials is to do things and to recommend doing more.

What is the significance of incidents of violence in the northeast? In answer to this question most American officials in Bangkok make a vague and canonical invocation of foreign Communist intervention—if violence exists, Peking or Hanoi, or a Peking-Hanoi axis, must be behind it. The trouble seems to be led by people trained in—and presumably controlled by—China and North Vietnam. There is general agreement that the number of people responsible for the trouble is small, which is one explanation for the insistence that the problem is foreign in origin.

Is there an element of popular rebellion in the problem? This would seem the crucial question, yet it is the one on which the least satisfactory answers can be found. I argued in *Commonweal* last fall that the main trouble lies in long-established ethnic and communal tensions in the region. Pursuing the matter in Bangkok, I got contradictory answers, the more interesting of which were these: From a Thai-speaking American with long experience in the country and much sympathy for it (a critic of the size of our intervention), a qualified "no." From

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an intelligent and qualified official, recently arrived but with reason to be directly concerned with the problem: communal tensions are unquestionably an element in the situation. From an American who has lived and worked in the northeast, a surprised "of course"—followed by a recital of names and groups involved: the So aboriginal people who live on both sides of the Laos border, the Vietnamese ethnic minority, some bandits, some leaders who are long-standing agitators for an autonomous northeast (including one whom "we put in business when the OSS first set up in that area during the Japanese occupation.") I should add that disagreement here could come from a disagreement over the prime cause. Are serious existing communal troubles being exploited by Communists, or are the Communists responsible for stirring up latent communal hostilities? Nearly everyone is also conscious of the problem of statistical fallacy—of crime rates, or in this case the rate of subversive incidents, which "increase" simply because someone has begun seriously keeping track of them. There is no question but that the Thai government has only recently begun to pay attention to the northeast.

But if the presence of foreign or foreign-trained Communist agents and of some indigenous unrest are assumed, what are the prospects of this situation developing into a major rebellion? Predictions of a new "war of national liberation" assume by definition that a really big popular movement with major grievances and a deep commitment to rebellion can emerge. What are the grievances?

On this, information—or even plausible argument—is hard to find. People mention poverty, but then add that no one in the northeast is destitute. They mention the government's neglect of development in the area, but then question whether the people there find this a matter of passionate concern. They suggest that there has been corruption or brutality in the conduct of some local officials and the police, but add that this is a matter of isolated incidents, or of commonplace abuses which people in the past have been accustomed to dealing with in their own way. All agree that the northeast is backward by comparison with the rest of Thailand, and that the government has neglected it, but no one I spoke with was able to identify a social, economic, or political issue which was general throughout the northeast and grave enough to provide a convincing explanation of why large numbers of people should be expected to go into open, armed rebellion against their government.

Going at the problem from another angle, I asked what issues were stressed by local Communist propaganda. Anti-Americanism is the main one—that Bangkok is handing the country over to foreign control. Beyond that, the Communists seem to have no very clearly-defined national or regional program, nor issues dramatic enough to have provoked much attention in Bangkok.

How, then, is a major rebellion to be brought about? The best answer I could get was that the Communists would do it through terrorism. A ruthless minority would be able to intimidate the peasants into cooperation, or at least into acquiescing in a campaign against the government. But at this point I insisted that the explanation isn't good enough. Terrorists certainly can intimidate people into silence, into giving food and shelter, into refusing to help the government's police and soldiers; but "another Vietnam" is not going to be created out of terrorism alone. People who live by terror also live in the midst of hatred and potential treachery; it is they, not the government, who are ultimately vulnerable to peasant vengeance.

The fact that I could not get clear answers in Bangkok to my questions does not mean that answers do not exist. It may be that there are popular grievances in Thailand important enough to provoke a mass rebellion. It may be that the Thai Communist Party is smarter than it seems, and less the puppet of foreign powers, and that it can put forward a comprehensive and popular program. It may be that the Thai government is disastrously out of touch with local conditions and that its administration is bitterly resented in the northeast. I do not know. But what seems to me important is that the official American community in Bangkok doesn't really know either.

And without knowing what the problem really is (or even being entirely convinced that a major problem exists), the United States is expanding programs of aid, of police and military training and support, and domestic propaganda, which increasingly involve us in the internal affairs of the country, lending plausibility to the one issue we know the Communists to be exploiting, and expanding our impact on those complex domestic sensitivities which already are a matter of serious official concern.

What is going on here is policymaking by assumption rather than evidence, unremarkable in itself but in this case involving a lot of people, a lot of money, and serious consequences for Thailand. For I do not think the Thai government really understood what it was in for when it agreed to a major American commitment within its country. Thailand's past experience has been with external dangers. France and Britain in the nineteenth century, Japan in the 1940s, were concerned with who ruled Bangkok, not with how well Bangkok ruled its provinces. Today things are different. Thailand's alliance with the United States is nominally directed against a foreign threat, but the real impact of the alliance is on Thailand's domestic affairs. The problem is not whether China or North Vietnam invades Thailand. It is whether Thailand undergoes a rebellion by elements in its own population. I think that the government in Bangkok is only now beginning to appreciate that in this situation a foreign ally may be a liability. But I also suspect that they have gone too far to turn back.

WILLIAM PFAFF

(This is the first of several reports on a recent trip to Thailand and Vietnam.)

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ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

TO THE REAR, MARCH

I remain dismayed at Rome's move to discourage "profane" music in the Mass and what are called "extreme" renderings of the liturgy—not so much over the actual text as over the use I fear may be made of it, in spite of adverse comment in this country.

The warning from Rome came from three sources: the Pope; the Sacred Congregation of Rites, the permanent body in charge of liturgical questions; and the Council for Application of the Constitution on the Liturgy. The Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy was the first to be approved by the Vatican Council. It was, as Pope Paul said, "the first subject to be examined and the first too, in a sense, in intrinsic worth and in importance for the life of the Church." But nothing in the Council's work, Pope Paul said in issuing his warning, "could authorize in the least the stripping away by one's own will from the cult of the Church the sacred and ornamental forms with which [the sacrament] must be celebrated and presented to the people of God."

What was the Pope aiming at? According to newspaper dispatches, his targets were "family eucharistic banquets" celebrated in private homes and "strange and arbitrary rites" accompanied often by "music of a totally profane and worldly character." These efforts were described as "almost incredible" abuses of the experimentation sanctioned by the Council.

What set Rome off on this matter was apparently reports like a recent one in *Paris Match* which showed some of the more advanced French and Dutch experiments. That issue of the French magazine has been received here, and I don't see what was so hair-raising—quite the contrary. One picture showed a priest and a group of young people at a service during which music was provided by guitars and other "profane" instruments. Another picture showed communicants receiving the consecrated Host in their hands rather than on their tongues. Still another showed a French priest seated on one side of a large table in a non-church building celebrating Mass for young men seated on the other side.

"For some time" the Rome statement said, "some newspapers and reviews having been publishing news items and photographs concerning liturgical ceremonies, particularly celebrations of the Eucharist, which are alien to Catholic worship and almost incredible." All bishops were therefore urged to exercise close control over liturgical practice and to suppress anything not clearly sanctioned by authority.

No doubt there are isolated instances in which this group or that has "gone too far"—although I do not think the examples pictured in *Paris Match* represent that. But do a few such cases call for such a thundering reaction in Rome? The truth is, I think, that the spirit of liturgical reform embodied in the Council Constitution will take some time to permeate the whole Church, and that very definitely includes Rome. As anyone who has spent any time there will testify, Rome has pastoral problems of its own to solve; indeed, churchmen in Rome might well spend less time worrying about the rest of the world and more time worrying about how to get more liturgical participation there. The alienation of French workers from the Church is by now well-known, but there are Italians—and Americans, for that matter—who are just as alienated; more power to those who show a little imagination in winning them back.

As others have already asked, what does Rome mean by "profane" music? Why is one instrument holy and another profane? What gives special status to an organ, say, and not to a guitar? Maybe guitars don't appeal to everybody, but why damn them for all? I have never been present at an all-out jazz Mass, but through my own teen-age children I have some knowledge of the use of guitars and folk-music at Mass. Through them I have seen how "reverent" such music can be, and I am not alone in this view. Experience all over the country has shown how effective such Masses can be, especially with high-school and college students, and I think the American bishops who permit them are very wise. What does collegiality mean if they are not to be allowed to decide even such matters as these in their own dioceses?

I feel the same way about Masses in the home, and think the bishops should not condemn them out of hand. The purpose in all these efforts is to recapture the meaning of the central act of Catholic worship. An occasional Mass in a home or some "different" circumstances can make the entire liturgy far more meaningful for a whole year. For years many priests have argued that experiments like these are essential to breathe life into our huge and too often depersonalized parishes, and they should be allowed to try.

What prompted the Rome statement? Not ill-will, of course. The problem, I think, is that too many people, in and out of Rome, still believe only that the liturgy should create awe and a sense of mystery. It should do that, of course, and perhaps at least one Mass on every Sunday might well be "old-fashioned," formal, full of ritual and ceremony. These elements should never be lost. But at this point in the history of the Church we desperately need meaning, intelligibility, and the trouble with the latest Rome posture is that it seems to overlook this fact.

JAMES O'GARA

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WILL CHINA INTERVENE?

The stakes in Vietnam

WILSON C. McWILLIAMS



China has succeeded to the status which Churchill assigned to Russia, "a riddle wrapped in an enigma," and in a world of perils either riddles or enigmas inspire anxiety rather than fascination. Spectrally present at all discussions of Asian policy, China is so unwanted a guest that the disputants often refer to her only by euphemism: a "land war in Asia," for example, does not mean a war in Vietnam, but a war with China. Despite the heat of the domestic foreign policy debate, suspicion and fear of China is common to critics and supporters of the Administration. The "domino theory" and the fear of escalation and "land war" alike are premised on Chinese aggressiveness; they differ on the accidents, but agree on the essence, of anxiety.

Like all totalitarian systems, China is prone to expansionism and to romantic self-delusion. Yet that abstract truth neglects a vital element in the nature of Chinese totalitarianism. Maoism is a doctrine for the seizure of power by military means; Leninism presumed that the military forces of the state had collapsed, Nazism that they could be neutralized. That long-recognized fact (Mao was accused of "military deviationism" in 1927) is vital in understanding the probable role of China in Asia. Revolutionary totalitarianism tends to monomania; its devotees may be shrewd to the point of brilliance within the limits of the doctrinal blueprint and foolish to the point of insanity outside those limits. Stalin or Hitler, in other words, could commit *military* blunders that Mao would never consider.

This general proposition is only sustained by the ferocity of China's international rhetoric. The nature of Maoism dictates a propaganda cast in the military terms which the doctrine comprehends. Naturally, Chinese declarations are alarming, and it is essential that we remember that Nazism, a doctrine for the *political* seizure of power, generated a disarming and even comforting propaganda. Totalitarian experts, like specialists everywhere, excel only in their own field.

Indeed, the conflict in the late 1950s between Mao and the military supporters of Marshal P'eng was not a debate between "Reds" and "experts" but between two sets of experts on military affairs. The central issue between the two was not military but political: the degree of possibility and opportunity which existed for the realization of Socialist revolutionary goals within the international political system. Atomic weapons, for example, were only a secondary consideration. It is now fairly clear that the Chinese leadership desired nuclear weapons before the Mao-P'eng controversy and before the break with the Soviet Union. The argument within China centered on the question of whether nuclear development should be pursued through close ties with the Soviet Union (thus postponing any independent leadership by China) or whether China should "go it alone" in *policy* even at the cost of being left on her own resources for nuclear development.

Varieties of Unreason

What took place, in other words, was a familiar pattern: the Maoists extended their view of the domestic situation of China to encompass the international system. That expansion was and is illegitimate and it did and does reflect the romantic tendency of totalitarian leaders to imagine possibilities as being greater than they are. The irrationality of the Maoist world-view, however, is a *political and*

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not a military unreason: on purely tactical, military terms Maoism is as prudent and ingenuous as it was in the more appropriate political context of the Chinese Revolution.

Conventional war in Korea resulted in a Chinese defeat. Americans, misled by the peculiar infatuation of MacArthur for bombing China, have often missed the point (the bombing of North Vietnam being an unfortunate witness) but the Chinese leadership has not. Indeed, part of the P'eng-Mao conflict was based on the realization of China's disadvantage in conventional war. P'eng took as chief priority a military modernization which would enable China to overcome that disadvantage. The Maoist dissent was not radical but it was doctrinaire: it affirmed the traditional conviction that China should *avoid* such conflicts, at least for the present, and concentrate in the partisan warfare in which the balance of advantages might be reversed.



That decision is vital in weighing the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam. The first military axiom which must be considered is that *guerrilla war is not open-ended*: it is limited by the ability of guerrillas to supply themselves off the country in which they operate without regular lines of communication. Hence, in any conflict, there is a limit to the number of troops that can be employed; beyond this limit, regular lines of communication and supply are necessary to maintain the troops, those supply lines must be defended, and the war tends to become a conventional "continuous front" battlefield.

The Chinese aversion to such conflicts is founded on the very political doctrine which creates so much anxiety in international relations. The belief that the "city is surrounded by the country" and that (by the doctrinaire logic of totalitarianism) therefore the industrial nations are surrounded by agrarian ones is founded on the truth that the city depends on fixed lines of communication, that these lines are long and difficult to defend, and that they are equally vulnerable at any point to small, lightly-armed partisan forces. Strain the point, and it is possible to argue that the industrial giants are dependent on their even longer (though less vulnerable) lines of communication with the raw-material sources of the "agrarian" world.

In both cases, however, the principle of Chinese tactics is clear: eschew fixed lines of communication, for these force a battle on the terms of the "city" and in which it has a decisive advantage.

For Vietnam, the result is obvious: the war must be limited to that level which maximally strains and hopefully exhausts the United States which is also *short* of the level at which conventional lines of communication become necessary. That "optimum point" is not precise but it does fall at a low enough level to *exclude* any major Chinese intervention in Vietnam short of the point of politico-military desperation.

Secondary considerations tend to the same result. If the United States, or some of its spokesmen, fear the Chinese nuclear capability, China is painfully aware of its own vulnerability. Even if one omits possible limited nuclear targets like the Chinese test-sites, which might tempt American policy-makers, China must have serious doubts as to the degree to which she can count on the Soviet nuclear "umbrella." Would the Soviet Union protect China at all? Would she do so if an attack on China resulted from intervention in Vietnam? From a Chinese use of nuclear weapons? The answer to these questions might be "yes," but the affirmation would hardly be a resounding one. Risks, moreover weigh more heavily in Peking than in Washington: the worst *denouement* from the American point of view, a general nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, is the *best* hope for China in the event that nuclear weapons are employed in Asia, a fact which can only strengthen the military prudence of Chinese leaders.

Turbulence Inside China

The results of the recent internal turbulence in China are less predictable, because China's internal turmoil touches political strategy more closely than military tactics. It is possible, for example, that far from weakening China's resolve, the disturbances might increase desperation and tempt Peking to a military adventure as a means to internal political solidarity. Yet other considerations minimize this danger. Peking's decision to employ the army in quelling disorder is one attendant with some risks. Once the tiger of military intervention is let loose, can it be rechained? Indeed, Lin Piao's exaggerated description of the riots as a "civil war" may have been an effort to define the conflict in military terms to avoid providing a precedent for military intervention in politics. The danger to the regime is not military disloyalty so much as a shift in initiative from the party to the army, the latter becoming a "pillar of the state." A foreign war would only heighten the salience of the military, give even greater prominence to army leaders and their demands (even as Korea did), and such a danger only adds to the others restraining intervention in Vietnam.

On the whole, China's internal crisis seems likely to strengthen what Morton Halperin has called an eagerness to "turn in" and to concentrate on the domestic tasks of the Chinese Revolution. This does not imply that Mao and his followers will change their view of the *nature* of the international system, but it may be that their recent

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series of rebuffs, combined with the internal disorders, may change their view of the range of possibilities open to China. Carry speculation a step further and it might be possible to draw seductive analogies to the Soviet conflict between Trotsky and Stalin, but this would probably be an exaggeration. It does seem reasonable, however, that the reaction of Chinese leaders may resemble the idealist-to-isolationist progression so often observed on the American left.

The balance of probabilities (and it is no more than that) must weigh against the likelihood of Chinese intervention in Vietnam. Yet that balance is still troubled by imponderables: degrees of desperation, pride, and rage against indignity.

Vietnam illustrates, in fact, how important those imponderables may be. Maoism asserts the reasonable proposition that the industrial powers will not fight determinedly for non-Western areas which are not worth the material cost of battle, but the American army in Vietnam is a standing proof that the world of symbol, value, and even of irrationality commands as much political consideration (if not more) in the great powers as it does in the developing states.

On one vital point, moreover, the Maoist thesis remains valid. However "important" Vietnam may have become to Americans and their leaders, it is *more* important to China. All prudential calculation would probably be discarded if the United States should invade North Vietnam, a lesson from Korea which it is *our* part to "learn." Moreover, China might feel a similar if less intense concern to avoid total defeat for her allies in South Vietnam. The proposals of the Administration for ending the war seem to comprehend that possibility, and to hold out a settlement far short of "victory" for the United States. Yet another imponderable must enter the scales: the American reaction to a genuine settlement in South Vietnam. The domestic opposition, if one reads the signs, is assembling its limited intellectual and unlimited oratorical skills to denounce appeasement and "lack of determination" in Vietnam. Our previous history inspires little confidence, though it is possible to venture a tender hope that we have learned something since the days of "who lost China?" and the Korean war.

Grant the hope and a challenge remains: peace in Asia demands a radical revision of American attitudes, not only toward China but toward India, Japan, the Soviet Union and international politics in general. That demand is of such magnitude as to make hope perilously close to folly, and therein lies the greatest threat to the development of American relations with China.

A Protestant-Catholic Viewpoint

PIGSKIN ECUMENISM

ROBERT McAFEE BROWN & MICHAEL NOVAK

"A liberal Catholic," the bishop suggested, "is one who doesn't care whether Notre Dame wins or loses."

By that test, no Catholic in the room was liberal. Three priests, one bishop, one Catholic layman, his wife, their one-year-old, plus a Protestant minister and his wife, all concentrated on the blue tube. Notre Dame was trailing Michigan State 10-0 and Terry Hanratty had suffered a dislocated arm. The minister and his wife weighed the discovery that according to the bishop's definition they were liberal Catholics.

After sampling the atmosphere for half an hour, the minister tried to cut the gloom. "I begin to think this is a partisan audience," he offered. No one came close to smiling.

"Dear," his wife queried during a commercial, "have we ever watched a game before with people who were rooting for Notre Dame?"

The one-year-old was systematically pulling the sports page apart in long slender strips.

The minister's wife answered her own question. "I can't ever remember meeting a Notre Dame fan before today," she decided.

It seemed time for the bishop to make a friendly ecumenical remark. "Is being here like being a Yankee fan in Brooklyn back in the good old days?" he asked, making a friendly ecumenical remark.

"No," the minster replied. "I'm not nearly as afraid of Catholics as I would have been if I'd been a Yankee fan in Brooklyn."

The bishop was ecumenically understanding. "Do I hear you saying that Protestants are afraid of Catholics?" Notre Dame was being penalized for illegal procedure.

"Well," the minister began slowly, letting the conversational metaphor revert to the sport at hand, "we've learned to respect your screen pass and your power plays, and we've been kneed once or twice in scrimmage."

"But no eye-gouging?", the bishop asked. Hopefully.

ROBERT MC AFEE BROWN *is a Protestant football fan and* MICHAEL NOVAK *is a Catholic football fan.*

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The minister hesitated for the barest fraction of a second. "No eye-gouging," he replied, "but a few end runs that left us gasping."

"That's progress on both sides . . ." the bishop began, only to be interrupted by a shout from the three priests and one layman, followed by a squeal from the one-year old. Notre Dame had scored on a touchdown pass from Coley O'Brien to Bob Gladieux.

"What's that?" the Catholic wife asked from the kitchen, where she was preparing refreshment suitable to the occasion.

"Notre Dame touchdown," her husband replied, concentrating on the extra point.

"Does that make it 10 to 3?" she asked.

"Didn't you ever study your catechism?", the first priest asked, full of moral outrage that such gaps in Catholic upbringing could exist in parochial school education. "What kind of nuns did you have?"

Azzaro's point after touchdown was chaste and direct. The extra point was received with gratitude, and a willingness to give credit where credit was due. "The nuns have been saying their rosaries again," someone (not the bishop) remarked.

"I was afraid for awhile they were all on picket lines," the third priest said. "That kind of inattention to basics would drop Notre Dame right into hell."

The minister, who had joined the party hoping to have some ecumenical discussion with a real live bishop, was glad the conversation had shifted from sports analysis to fundamental theology.

During half time, the subject of nuns unavoidably came up again. The camera zoomed in on an MSU placard reading:

HAIL MARY FULL OF GRACE
NOTRE DAME'S IN SECOND PLACE.

"They're crazy to tempt the nuns that way," the second priest pointed out. "Before the game (and may I receive absolution for it) I figured MSU to win, 28-7. But one more sign like that and the nuns all over the country will be praying for a Catholic victory. They'll have us right back in the ball game. Right now," he concluded in a burst of optimism, "I'd call it a tossup."

The Hail Mary placard, combined with the refreshments the Catholic wife had brought in from the kitchen, inspired a rash of impromptu priestly parodies:

CATHOLIC SCHOOLS ARE ALL TOO FEW
IF GOD IS DEAD AT MSU.
MSU MAY TRY END RUNS
BUT NOTRE DAME RELIES ON NUNS.

"They say Parseghian puts a lot of faith in prayer—medals, novenas, all that sort of thing," the third priest said.

"Not to mention 270-pound tackles," commented the bishop, ever the realist.

The second half was agony, punctuated mainly by exclamations of episcopal approbation when a Notre Dame field goal tied the score, priestly pouting when another field goal attempt failed, and a division of the house when Notre Dame elected to finish the game on the ground instead of taking to the air.

The post-game analysis was underway even before the first post-game commercial, and began on the mundane level of Hanratty's injury and Nick Eddy's misstep getting off the train the day before. But the discussion soon moved from matters physiological to matters theological. The first priest stated the thesis bluntly, and the silent acquiescence of the Catholics present indicated that he had articulated a hidden consensus.

"The nuns let us down," he said. "Instead of sitting by their TV sets praying for victory, they were probably out doing works of mercy."

The second priest confirmed the thesis by reminiscence. "Remember that 1964 game with Southern Cal, when we lost in the last eighteen seconds?" He paused long enough to wince. "The nuns must have stopped praying just a little too soon."

Such trust in the power of the flesh, unsupported even for eighteen seconds by the strong right arm of the Lord, was suitably classified as heresy.

The third priest summed up the indictment. "We just didn't have enough nun power," he concluded.

The bishop, pastor of *all* the faithful, did not participate in the condemnation.

The minister, feeling that in the ecumenical era someone should say a kind word for nuns, felt called to their defense. It seemed the Protestant thing to do.

"I don't think it's fair to blame the nuns for the fact that Notre Dame got no more than a tie," he began diffidently. Then, warming up to his subject, and with a feeling that far ahead a light was shining, he continued:

"Look at it this way. Notre Dame was behind 10-0. You could so easily have lost. And yet you rallied to avert disaster. You refused to stay behind. You did not lie down and play dead. Against overwhelming odds you caught up. Which just goes to show," he concluded, "what the ecumenical movement has done for the Catholic Church."

"Whaddya mean, 'the ecumenical movement'?", one of the priests asked, with a sudden infusion of new life. One could feel the adrenal glands at work. Surrendering a scapegoat is never easy. "That team out on the field this afternoon is the finest collection of Catholic boys Notre Dame has fielded in ten years. O'Leary, Lynch, O'Brien, Hanratty, Conjar, Gladieux. . ."

". . . coached by Ara Parseghian," the minister inserted.

"Okay, okay," the priest responded. "So the team can't get anywhere without the coach, and we had some lean years at Notre Dame before Parseghian came along. But what's the ecumenical movement got to do with it?"

"Parseghian," the minister replied, the light bursting full upon him, "is a Presbyterian."

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Open Break

REUTHER VS. MEANY

SIDNEY LENS

At the fork of a river, where two branches veer off, the distance between them is still small; further along it can become enormously large. The open break between the goliaths of AFL-CIO, Walter Reuther and George Meany, seems at first glance to be minor, even personal. But as the song says, it can be the start of something big, perhaps something of historical portent.

Reuther is irked at many things, at many levels of importance, none of which in itself appears to be significant enough to cause permanent rupture. Yet added up they indicate that the two men are travelling in different directions. Both of them are aware of it, Reuther to such an extent that at one point he weighed the pros and cons of withdrawing the auto union from the Federation.

The idea was given up in favor of what might be called "living together, separately." But this may be a distinction without a difference.

Reuther is miffed, to begin with, because Meany has stopped consulting him and no longer seeks a consensus on major issues. When the AFL and CIO were merged in December 1955, Meany as the president of the larger body was given the top post in the wedded group. But it was always understood that he would seek the advice of the former president of the CIO and try to act in unison. For a long time now that has not been happening. As a matter of fact the small body of eight men—president, secretary-treasurer, and six vice-presidents—who were to act as a policy-making executive committee where conflicting views might be harmonized, has been buried without the benefit of a formal funeral.

The failure to establish this working relationship after 11 years reflects, alas, a deeper failure—the failure to blend antipathetical social attitudes. Both men are devotees of what is euphemistically called the "free enterprise" system. But Reuther is the personification of *social* unionism, which demands large scale face-lifting of the system, Meany of *business* unionism, which is highly uncomfortable with crusades. Typically, Reuther, though he is no longer the irrepressible socialist of the 1930's, walks with Martin Luther King in Selma or pickets with the grape strikers in California. The "honest plumber," by contrast, not only eschews such symbolic solidarity, but *boasts* that he has never walked a picket line or been on strike in his life.

For Meany the addition of a million members to the AFL-CIO in the last couple of years—mainly due to enlargement of the blue-collar force with the Vietnam war and the growth in government organizing with an assist by John Kennedy—falls under the nomenclature "success." Reuther is painfully conscious that the AFL-CIO today represents a smaller portion of the labor force than it did at birth. The grandiose organizing plans that were envisioned in 1955, in the South, amongst white-collar workers, in agriculture and the service industries, have been stillborn or minuscule at best. And though the AFL-CIO has pipe-lines to the White House and "friends" on Capitol Hill, it is not part of the "in" group as it was in Roosevelt's day.

Labor's Role

Reuther is distressed with the *image* of labor under Meany. It no longer blazes trails in the civil rights field, as it did in the 1930's. Its lobbying activities for social change have the dull luster of a rockbound institution, rather than the flaming zeal of a crusader. When it speaks for rebuilding the cities, more public housing, better education, medicare, it speaks as an echo. It is no longer the center of the liberal movement but a loosely-tied tail to it.

In the realms of international affairs the situation, insofar as Reuther is concerned, is even worse. On many issues, Meany and the former general secretary of the Communist Party, Jay Lovestone, who heads his international affairs department, is to the right of the Chamber of Commerce—e.g., on the question of trade with the Communist nations.

Reuther, like Meany, is an anti-Communist, a supporter of the Vietnam war, an advocate of "strength" through military power. But he cannot stomach the "narrow and negative" anti-Communism of the Meany-Lovestone clan. He has been chafing at the bit for years over Lovestone's kinship with the Central Intelligence Agency and his cloak-and-dagger operation.

The Lovestone issue, in fact, was one of the immediate causes of the schism. Reuther has wanted him tossed out of the movement since 1955, but he has kept publicly silent until the middle of last year when his brother,

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Victor Reuther, openly criticized Lovestone.

What rankles Reuther here is something more than tone. If Lovestone isn't a card-carrying member of the CIA he certainly follows its general line. The full facts of his machinations since World War II are not known, but they include such questionable deeds—by himself and his cohorts—as splitting the French and Italian labor movements in a vain effort to weaken the Communists, organizing goon squads to unload munitions ships which Communist unions in Marseilles refused to unload, sponsoring a general strike to overthrow the Cheddi Jagan government in British Guiana, working hand-in-glove with such anti-union employers as Grace and Rockefeller in trying to foist conservative unionism on Latin America, building a reactionary labor federation in the Dominican Republic with a carbon-copy anti-Communism to that of Lovestone himself, preventing a legitimate strike of Greek unionists, and gracelessly supporting U.S. interventionist policies.

In between, the Lovestone contingent has no doubt gathered mountains of information, through clouded sources, for the American government, and has spread tons of monies to exile groups who are engaged in secret and questionable activities inside the Soviet world. Where all this money has come from—only a tiny portion of it recorded in AFL-CIO financial statements—is a proper subject for investigation.



It is not merely the Lovestone-Meany philosophy on foreign affairs that alienates Reuther, but the fact that its rightist mien has driven a deep wedge between labor and liberalism; and, even more, between labor and the young enthusiasts of the New Left. Reuther senses that the AFL-CIO has failed "to develop stronger ties with labor's historic and essential allies in the liberal intellectual and academic community and among America's young people." This is probably the key to the whole dispute, and a hint of where the separate paths are leading.

Reuther intends to reestablish these ties, firm them up. His assistants are currently working out an organizing and social program pointing the way. After such plans are elaborated the Reutherites will start mobilizing allies, primarily among the old CIO unions—including the large steelworkers organization now led by I. W. Abel—but also in some former AFL groups and, surprisingly, in a large section of the teamsters' union.

The program probably will include steps to organize "the poor," such as the pilot project under way in Chicago where the Industrial Union Department, which Reuther heads, is working closely with Martin Luther King's civil rights movement to form tenant unions, unionize low-paid hospital workers, and strengthen community groups of Negro and white poor. It will probably also take a new look at foreign policy, not to break with the Administration entirely but to soften the "big stick" stance; suggest means of working with civil rights and youth groups; as well as chart a more militant lobbying and electoral course.

Reuther and Lewis

All of this places Reuther in an historical position not unlike that of John L. Lewis in the 1930's. Historical analogies are tricky, since there are obvious differences both between Reuther and Lewis and the 1960's and 1930's. Yet there are some teeth to the analogy.

Reuther and Lewis are not the same type of unionists. Lewis' record before the CIO was formed was hardly exemplary; his career was studded with not a little strike-breaking and more than a little headsmashing and violence against socialist and Communist opponents in his ranks. Lewis was a one-man dictator who imposed trusteeships on every district that challenged him—a majority of the miners' union.

Reuther, on the other hand, tolerates dissent from associates and underlings in a way Lewis would never dream of. And though he maintains firm control of the UAW, it is not through imposing trusteeships. A UAW staff member can still tell Reuther he is all wet on an issue and remain on the payroll. Emil Mazey, the union's secretary-treasurer and second in command, has opposed the Vietnam war and the arms race for years—at variance with Reuther—but has remained on the Reuther ticket.

The 1960's too are admittedly not the 1930's. Lyndon Johnson is no Roosevelt, despite his Great Society; and though there are a few new figures like Caesar Chavez organizing the downtrodden in agriculture and elsewhere, the blazing leftist of the 1930's who devoted his life to the movement has not been replaced by a comparable force. Yet there is a parallel in Reuther's and Lewis' position. Both men confronted a labor movement out of touch with its times.

The AFL in the 1930's, headed by a colorless ex-miner named William Green, was an historical ostrich. It refused to organize the millions of mass production workers clamoring for unionism, out of fear they would upset the bureaucratic applecart. It broke some of their strikes. For a while it even opposed such social planks as relief and unemployment compensation. If the AFL

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had any vision at all, which is doubtful, it was of the porkchop—and only for the skilled workers who were its constituency.

What Lewis did was to forge an alliance between the "center"—his group in the AFL—and the Communists, socialists, Trotskyists and ex-Wobblies (Industrial Workers of the World) on the left—the anonymous figures that organized auto, steel, rubber, packinghouse, maritime, longshoremen and others.

Reuther stands in a similar historical chasm. Meany is no Green; he is more colorful. The AFL-CIO has imbibed a little of the brew of the last three decades of welfarism. It has made peace with such "socialistic" reforms as unemployment compensation and today engages in national electoral politics in a way Green would have sternly renounced. But the AFL-CIO under Meany *has* created a great vacuum between itself and the forces left of center, especially the New Left. It has no true links with the civil rights groups, the young people of SNCC and SDS, the Martin Luther King movement, or even the Americans for Democratic Action.

Reuther may very well be the bridge, the man who forges a labor-liberal-radical coalition more independent of the establishment, grappling with problems such as the guaranteed annual income, racial freedom, national health insurance, the rebuilding of cities, the extirpation of poverty. Such an alliance would not be total, for it is doubtful that Reuther will yield to the peace platform of the New Left or the American pacifists. But it may, if it succeeds in coming about, fill part of the vacuum, and shift the center of gravity in U.S. politics a notch or two to the left.

Birth control

THE POPE'S CONSCIENCE

JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.

It has always been a sound rule of historical study not to attribute bad faith or stupidity to some writer of the past unless there was compelling evidence to justify such a verdict. On the whole, our predecessors have been as conscientious and as intelligent as we; and although it is easy to dismiss a past decision with which we disagree by finding its author dishonest or stupid, this is a method likely to lead to bad history, simplistic exaggerations, and anachronistic moralism. These observations apply to judgments about present decisions made by living persons.

In the current controversy over birth control, both the intelligence and the honesty of the Pope have been challenged because of his statement on the subject of October 29, 1966. In this statement the Pope made clear that he was not making a final decision, that the matter needed more study, and that pending his final decision, the governing norms had not changed. One could not act "as if the teaching authority of the Church were in a state of doubt." Some writers immediately found the Pope guilty of stupidity on the grounds that, as a commission of experts had just returned a divided report on the norms, they must be in doubt. Charles Davis went further. Writing as editor of *The Clergy Review* in December, 1966, he questioned the reasons for the delayed pronouncement and asserted "the Church is in danger of losing its soul to save its face." More bluntly, in his apology for leaving the Church, in the January 1, 1967 *Observer Review,* he directly attacked the honesty of Paul VI: "One who claims to be the moral leader of mankind should not tell lies. To say, as the Pope did, that the teaching authority of the Church was not in a state of doubt on the issue of birth control was to deny a plain fact." The postponement of the decision, he said, was "an act of callous dishonesty."

Was there any compelling evidence on which to base the charges of incompetence or bad faith? There was support for such charges only if it were assumed that the Pope was asserting that there was no doubt as to the teaching that contraception was against divine and natural law. Such assumption might have been made by those who have not studied the course of controversy in the Church in the last five years or who have not paid attention to recent papal and conciliar statements. Such an assumption might also have been happily adopted by the small band of conservative theologians who believe that change in the law on contraception is impossible. Apart from conservative bias or lack of information, the history of earlier thought on contraception might also have argued to adoption of the assumption. Yet this history is not unmixed in its implications, and I believe an historian trying to interpret the Pope's statement would take into account two additional factors: the knowledge and attitude of the present Pope himself, and the language of recent official pronouncements.

Paul VI had found in existence at the start of his pontificate a commission of six experts set up by John XXIII

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to investigate the lawfulness of the progesterone pills. He had expanded this group substantially to an international body of fifty, and he had enlarged the terms of its mission. The question before it, he had declared, was "according to what norms, and in what form, should the spouses in their exercise of mutual love accomplish that service to life to which their vocation calls them?" (*Acta apostolicae sedis* 57:389) All during his pontificate he had followed the deliberations of this commission. He had told a correspondent for *Corriere della Sera* that the decision was an agonizing one for which he prayed for divine guidance. For a period of four months, from the end of June, 1966 to the end of October, 1966, he had been considering the voluminous report of the commission. After this long immersion in deliberation, after this painful period of doubt, he would have to be supposed an obtuse reader or guilty of equivocation if he indeed meant to say that there was no doubt as to the law of God on contraception.

Here is a pontiff whose acumen has been demonstrated in a great variety of ways, who for thirty years has performed with great skill a number of exacting tasks in the public eye. Did such a prudent and refined intelligence suddenly become obtuse? It is an unlikely historical hypothesis. As to moral probity, it would be the judgment of informed observers that Paul VI is a man of delicate conscience, of moral scrupulousness, distinguished indeed by his acute sense of the awesome accountability of his office. To call such a man a teller of lies, to find his action callously dishonest would require very great evidence overturning the reputation of a lifetime. Instead of such evidence, all that exists is an assumption that is inconsistent with recent theological history.

The first public statement of Paul VI on birth control was made to the Cardinals on June 23, 1964. Here he spoke of the Church's competence to declare the law of God, but recognized that there were other competences, in particular that of married couples themselves, which were relevant in deciding the lawfulness of birth control. He declared that he had not yet seen reason to find "the norms given by our predecessors" to be "out of date." Until further decision, "it seems good that Catholics wish to observe a single law." (*Acta apostolicae sedis,* 56:588) It is plain in this statement that while the Pope recognizes a divine foundation for the rule against contraception, he does not teach that the present norms are divine. They are "given" by predecessors. They may become "out of date." They presently provide desirable uniformity for Catholic behavior in an important matter.

On December 5, 1965 the Second Vatican Council enacted and the Pope promulgated *Gaudium et spes,* the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. This document was addressed to Christians and to all men. However, in dealing expressly with the rules as to contraception the Council turned from addressing all men in order to speak exclusively to Catholics. "In regulating generation," the Council taught, "it is not lawful for children of the Church to use means reproved by the magisterium in explaining the divine law." Again, as in the papal statement of June 23, 1964, an element of divine law was recognized as the foundation of the prohibition of contraception. But the existing prohibition was not described as itself being divine law. Rather an obligation in terms of law binding the children of the Church was enunciated by the Council.

In the address of October 29, 1966 the Pope spoke in the same way: "We will recall here only what we have expounded in our discourse of June 23, 1964." The governing norms were not in doubt. How could they be? They had been reaffirmed as binding by Pope and Council less than a year ago. The teaching authority of the Church was not in doubt, for this teaching authority often expressed itself by rules designed to educate the faithful. Yet as the Pope made clear, there was doubt as to whether the present norms had to continue; there was doubt, then, as to whether these norms constituted divine law.

True the Pope did not say, in so many words, "there is doubt as to the divine law." But he said as much for all who had ears to hear. He said that his statement was not a final decision. If it were not a final decision, it would only be because there was doubt as to the divine, immutable character of the law. To charge the Pope with dishonesty because he indicated pointedly and directly that the norms could change but did not say so in words of one syllable seems to measure honesty in the terms of fundamental literalism. By the ordinary canons of historical study the October 29, 1966, address said that the prohibition of contraception could change, thereby implying that it was not immutable divine law even while the norms set by past Popes required the generous obedience of the faithful.

The reason why the Pope has not spoken is not to be found by criticism of his intelligence or his character, nor by engaging in the nascent science of Vaticanology. It is to be found very simply expressed by his friend Father Giacomo Perico, a Jesuit from Milan, in a short article in Italian entitled "Why the Holy Father Does Not Speak." The Holy Father has not spoken, Father Perico reports, because in this very complex matter he wants to understand personally all the factors involved. Contrary to simplistic belief, knowledge is not infused in a Pope. It is acquired by study. The Pope is studying. As he himself said in the discourse of Oct. 29, his path to truth must be through a grasp of "historically speculative, theological knowledge." In following this path and protected by the Holy Spirit, he is, he says, a "passionate, humble and attentive learner." In a matter of such great importance to millions of persons, born and to be born, he believes that he cannot discharge his office by accepting the report of experts. He, himself, must know and judge personally. This is the decision not of a callous, but of a conscientious man. Its honesty requires respect.

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Franco and the Church

THE PAIN IN SPAIN

JAY CASE

How does one describe the present upheaval in the Spanish Church? Is it a struggle between a progressive young clergy on one side, and an old and fearful hierarchy on the other? Or is it a social phenomenon: a Church of the working class versus the entrenched bourgeois Catholicism of the last hundred years? Or is it a battle over the separation of Church and State?

It is none of these things singly and all of them collectively. What is happening is as much a consequence of the sterile polemic of the last 150 years of Spanish history as the result of the hope born of the Council. The present frictions are manifestations of a growing social consciousness among younger Catholics; they also evidence a highly developed theological sophistication among a small, but not unimportant, group of laity. Moreover, the conflict within the Church would be unintelligible, not to say impossible, were it not that Spain has for the last seven or eight years committed itself to integration with Europe, a fact that highlights the lack of evolution in many aspects of Church life.

The above sketch must be confusing to most readers, but it only reflects what is an extremely complex situation, one which cannot be neatly categorized. An awareness of this complexity may at least prevent any misreading of what I write. For a description of the present situation must inevitably center on the bishops and their largely negative response to pleas for change; and this attention to the bishops can give the impression that the hierarchy have acted in isolation from the demands of the clergy and laity. Such a conclusion would not be entirely correct. The bishops still represent the thinking of "mainstream" Catholicism in Spain. The mainstream may be changing rapidly, but that is not the point. The bishops have expressed a widespread fear (shall I say terror?) that grips many Catholics of the middle and upper classes when separation from the Franco regime or Church wealth and class identification are discussed.

When one looks back on 1966 it seems incredible that the hierarchy could have created such a climate of disillusionment so rapidly among so many of the clergy and laity. But they did. The police-beating of a hundred demonstrating priests in Barcelona in early May showed how far apart large elements of the clergy are from the episcopacy. The priests who took part in the Barcelona demonstration merely intended to present a letter to the head of the police, to protest against police brutality in connection with recent disturbances in the university in Barcelona. They carried no signs and sang no songs. But someone became jittery at the sight of so many cassocks in front of police headquarters, and the clubs began to swing on clerical heads.

Yet what embittered many was not the violence of the police, but the almost total passivity of the bishops. Some weak statements were issued concerning the government-controlled press and television which reported the incident in the most biased manner imaginable. But these mild and indirect rebukes to the government were tempered by the evident displeasure of the hierarchy at the priests' action. The Cardinal President of the Episcopal Conference referred to the incident as "that tumultuous form of protest, so contrary to the priestly spirit." *Ecclesia,* the official organ of the bishops' Catholic Action movement noted serenely: "When a public position on an issue of this nature is taken exclusively by priests, we must not forget that this collective action involves the Church, and for that reason must always be taken with the prior approval of the hierarchy." Under normal circumstances the principle of "prior approval" is undoubtedly correct, but is the situation in Spain normal? No one seriously believes the hierarchy would ever approve a public protest against the present government; yet there are times when such a protest may be necessary. Prior approval would seem to mean in practice that priests must keep quiet even when they are convinced the government is acting immorally.

But I am not concerned here with the principle as much as with the reaction of many priests to the bishops' refusal of support for the Barcelona protest. As the priest-authors of the famous *Acción Moisés* declaration graphically put it: "It was with disbelief that we recently witnessed our hierarchy discredit without adequate hearing the peaceful gesture of some priests, without at the same time condemning . . . the violent act of the police and the tendentious campaign of the controlled communications media; all this is so disheartening, as if it were our own pastors who threw us to the wolves."

Shortly after the Barcelona incident, the leadership of the Spanish Catholic Action movement held its annual meeting in June at the Valle de los Caídos near Madrid.

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The overriding concern of the conference was the application of the reforms of the Council in Spain, and in particular freedom and independence from State control and State-granted privilege. The conclusions reached during the sessions proved more radical than the episcopal head of Catholic Action, Archbishop Casimiro Morcillo of Madrid, could accept. In his speech at the close of the four-day meeting he clearly rejected the efforts of the lay leaders to identify Catholic Action with any position that might imply a moral judgment on existing Spanish social and political structures. Such judgments, he said, were the prerogative of the hierarchy: "because of their importance and intrinsic complexity, no branch, no special group, no publication of Catholic Action can make them without an explicit mandate which Catholic Action has not received or, if at one time it did receive such a mandate, it has since been rescinded. If at any time the hierarchy should consider Catholic Action capable of assisting in this function, it will not hesitate to seek its help." A more severe rebuke could scarcely be imagined.

To make matters worse, the week after the meeting of the Catholic Action leadership the Permanent Commission of the Episcopal Conference met in Madrid and determined, among other things, to suspend immediately and until further notice all Catholic Action group meetings on a national scale. Moreover, the commission formally rejected the conclusions of the June meeting because of their "temporalism," that is, their alleged involvement in politics and social criticism. At this writing, we are waiting for the plenary session of the Episcopal Conference to be held in February, one of whose principal concerns will be the future of Catholic Action. There is no sense predicting what will happen at that meeting; conceivably it could result in a complete rupture between the hierarchy and organized lay activity. Most likely it will not, since the greater openness of the November meeting of the Episcopal Conference offers hope that at least a minimal understanding can be reached between the Catholic Action leadership and the hierarchy.

As if the Barcelona disturbance and the clash with Catholic Action were not enough, the Permanent Commission of the Episcopal Conference issued a pastoral instruction in late June on "The Church and the Temporal Order in the Light of the Second Vatican Council" which can only be described as disastrous. The instruction was intended to be an authoritative application of Council teaching to the peculiar circumstances of Spain. One would think that such a document would say something specific about religious liberty; possible revision of the Concordat (which includes the appointment of bishops and salaries for the clergy among other things); the right of free association (for example: truly representative associations of workers, something that does not exist in Spain); and the development of some kind of genuine political dialogue. On these points it had nothing significant to contribute.

Instead the instruction noted the good will of the Franco regime to update Spanish political and social structures: "Granted the government's real desire to approximate present institutions as much as possible to the ideal [of the Council], the Church has no reason to pass judgment on said institutions." The meaning of this and other similar statements is not hard to determine: the Church has no business meddling in politics.

In itself this is not a bad principle, but in Spain politics has an all-inclusive meaning, at least in practice. The position taken by the bishops is hard to distinguish from a renunciation of any collective Christian witness in social matters of fundamental importance. Or put in other words, the pastoral instruction amounted to unreserved support of the policies and practices of the Franco government. At least this was the interpretation of many priests and laity.

Acción Moisés

Shortly after the publication of the pastoral instruction a clandestine document began circulating among the clergy in many parts of the country. The declaration, known as *Acción Moisés,* was a vigorous attack on the Spanish episcopacy and its alleged refusal to implement the reforms of the Council. The intensity of its language and the profound disillusionment with the hierarchy which it expresses can only be explained in terms of the events discussed above. Once enough signatures had been gathered, the sponsors of the declaration intended to send a copy to each Spanish bishop, to Rome, and to the other European episcopal conferences. The effort to gather signatures was discovered by the bishops a month or so after the document began circulating, and was promptly stopped for fear of reprisals. (Estimates vary as to how many priests actually did sign. Some put the figure at 4,000, but I think this number much too high; perhaps somewhere between one and two thousand signatures were gathered, but that remains a guess.)

A few sample phrases from the declaration may help capture its tone and intent: "The infidelity of the bishops is attributed to one basic cause: complicity and compromise with the State. . . . The Spanish government has done and continues to do everything possible to identify the Church with itself; and the Church has never done anything decisive to prove the contrary. . . . Our bishops are too subservient to the powerful: the State, the economic and social elite, the privileged. Indeed, the bishops were chosen and named by the State precisely because they were subservient or because they gave signs of becoming so."

Acción Moisés proposed two fundamental changes in the Spanish Church: complete separation from the gov-

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ernment and renunciation of all excess wealth. These two changes are in reality only two aspects of the same thing. The Church cannot witness a truly evangelical poverty and at the same time receive special treatment from the State; Christian poverty is a sham unless it includes a renunciation of power and privilege. The exceptional power of *Acción Moisés* lies in its grasp of the intimate relation between freedom from human power elites and Christian poverty.

While *Acción Moisés* is certainly correct in its fundamental assertions, its tone and style are abrasive. The declaration is brutally honest, and in this lies one of its chief strengths, as well as its fundamental weakness: it is as brutal as it is honest. It has immense value because it expresses a very real state of disillusionment among many priests eager to put the reforms of the Council into action. But disillusionment cannot serve as an adequate basis for dialogue, and dialogue is certainly the most immediate need of the Church in Spain today. Perhaps the very forthrightness of the declaration may at least help clear the air for some future rapprochement. The bishops ought to know by now that they cannot act as if the Council never happened; the day is gone when conformity could be achieved by simple episcopal fiat. If this lesson is learned, *Acción Moisés* may have contributed to something solid and lasting.

an exchange of views

"LBJ—'NEAR GREAT'"

Roxbury, Mass.

To the Editors: William V. Shannon ("LBJ—'Near Great,'" Jan. 6) believes that history will hold Lyndon Johnson in higher regard than his contemporaries do. He proffers this risky conjecture because he believes the major policy decisions Johnson has followed, especially on foreign policy, have been correct ones. On Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and Europe, Mr. Shannon argues, Johnson "has pursued the right course" and the "historical verdict will be favorable." I disagree completely. Today we often hear it said that somehow the future has the power to make our present catastrophic course look good in restrospect. I think this sort of prognostication is misleading in the extreme. If anything our present policies will look a lot worse in the perspective of history.

Let us set aside Europe for the moment. The American policy of withholding recognition from East Germany and at the same time rebuilding West Germany's military power was not Johnson's invention. The grave consequences it could still produce cannot be blamed on him; in fact he has even taken positive steps to improve our relations with Eastern Europe. But in Latin America and Southeast Asia Lyndon Johnson has resoundingly flunked the test of greatness. The only future generation of Americans in whose esteem "he will stand higher," as Mr. Shannon's forecast has it, would be a future generation still doggedly pursuing the same self-defeating policies.

Our razing of Vietnam with fire and crop poison in a misguided effort to stem Communism simply can be defended, as Shannon tries to do, only on the basis of the outworn containment policy forged in the Stalinist era. But it is precisely this rigid policy that is now in question, even by those people (George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau), who helped to forge it. Lyndon Johnson will be remembered, if current policies permit the existence of a future generation who will remember anything, as the inflexible automaton who implacably applied and enlarged policies which had already become obsolescent when he came to office. An imaginative President, aided by an alert Secretary of State, would have seen that the 1960's are not the 1940's, that Communism is no longer monolithic and that revolutions in which Communists are active in poor nations may be to the best interest of such nations and, in the long run, in the best interests of the USA.

Mr. Shannon believes what we are doing in Vietnam is trying "to draw a line beyond which hostile powers cannot impose their will by armed force." To most of the world, Mr. Shannon obviously excluded, it appears obvious that the hostile power now trying to impose its will on the people of Vietnam is none other than the USA. No reasonable person will argue that pistol-packin' Marshall Ky's regime represents the "will" of the people of Vietnam. Yet it is this flimsy military dictatorship we are now imposing with 500,000 troops.

To claim, as Mr. Shannon does, that our presence in Vietnam, is merely to pursue a quarter-century-old American policy designed to "prevent the domination of Asia by a single power" is not very persuasive. I presume he means China but does he really believe a unified Vietnam organized by Ho Chi Minh's party would increase Chinese hegemony? No close observer of SE Asia would agree. Would such a turn of events in Vietnam really expose such nations as Japan and Indonesia to the imminent danger of a takeover by Red China? The Japanese certainly do not think so. They were glar-

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ingly missing from the "New Asia" charade pasted together by Johnson during his Manila election trip.

It seems much more logical to many people that the USA is pulverizing Vietnam today not to prevent its domination by China but to stave off its domination by the Vietnamese, a majority of whom would probably want to organize and run it in ways we would disapprove of. This is hardly a policy calculated to make future generations proud of the foresight and vision of their present chief executive. A President with any insight would have realized that America cannot have its way everywhere in the world and would have striven for real greatness by challenging his people, in policy and pronouncement, to live in a pluralistic world. This Lyndon Johnson has miserably failed to do.



Finally the Dominican Republic bungle. Mr. Shannon believes Johnson "cannot be judged imprudent" for dispatching marines to Santo Domingo to protect a military dictatorship that was threatened by a movement intent on restoring a democratic socialist regime. Maybe history will judge Lyndon Johnson mercifully. But about 200 million Latin Americans do not. Most Latin Americans contend that the American invasion of the Dominican Republic did more to ruin inter-American relations and to destroy the chances for real economic and political maturation in their continent than anything else in recent history. To progressive Latin Americans the Dominican intervention seemed to be a clear warning that Uncle Sam will look the other way when revolutions install military cliques that preserve good relations with United Fruit Co. (We looked the other way when this happened a few months earlier in the Dominican Republic.) But in Santo Domingo the US demonstrated its readiness to intervene anywhere it chooses if there is real or imagined Communist participation in revolutionary social change.

Our Dominican intervention brought joy to the hearts of military and anti-democratic forces all over Latin America. In April 1964, a cabal of generals had already taken over Brazil, and gained nearly instant recognition from Washington. The generals forthwith conducted a ruthless purge of democratic opposition and unilaterally banned several national political leaders from public life. More recently right-wing military forces seized control in Argentina and then sent police to beat up university professors who disapproved. Meanwhile the starved bodies of men and women are shoveled off the streets in northeast Brazil and hunger stalks the crowded *favellas* of Lima, Caracas and Sao Paulo. The generals do nothing. The rich get richer.

United States policy in Latin America, vividly symbolized by our suppression of a democratic revolution in the Dominican Republic, can only be described as disastrous. History will surely certify this. By chumming up with military dictators and stamping out movements for progressive change we are setting the stage for a series of bloody popular uprisings that are bound to be stridently anti-American. Any future generation which remembers Lyndon Johnson "with esteem" for this shortsighted policy will be a future generation penned up in an isolated and xenophobic North American ghetto, grown insensitive about the hunger and injustice of the world, still recoiling in hysteria whenever the shepherd boy calls "Wolf" or "Communist." If Lyndon Johnson had his finger on the real pulse-beat of Latin America, he would have welcomed Juan Bosch back to power and dispatched aid, not marines. He would welcome the forces, many of them led by progressive Catholics, that are working for radical social change in Latin America. He would not be dominated by the illegitimate and short-range interests of some American corporations but would forge a Latin American policy that is in the long range interest of all the Americas.

Will history be kind to Lyndon Johnson? Who knows? History takes some strange and unexpected turns. Its course is difficult to predict. But the policies Johnson is now pursuing in Southeast Asia and in Latin America disclose a mentality determined more by the past than by the future. They exhibit a certain compulsiveness: the repetition of acts which once made sense in the world but seem bizarre and even psychopathic in the world of 1967. If the America of the future thinks well of what Lyndon Johnson is doing today, it is not the kind of America in which I would want my children to be living.

HARVEY COX

Reply

New York, N.Y.

To the Editors: Since Mr. Cox ends with a discussion of Latin America, I will pick up the argument there. It is strange that Mr. Johnson is belabored for his intervention in the Dominican Republic, but given no credit for the peaceful, democratic, and potentially constructive result he achieved there. American troops have been withdrawn. Juan Bosch was able to compete for the presidency in an election which, though not ideal, was judged by Norman Thomas and other liberal observers to be

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reasonably fair and honest.

We have to recognize that in terms of economic resources, the Dominican Republic is a poor country. No government of any ideological persuasion is going to achieve economic development and modernization of the society in any quick fashion. Moreover, the country has almost no tradition of honest government, political fair play, or secure liberty. I rank these political values as high or higher than economic development—and I assume Mr. Cox does—but they, too, take time to develop. If the Dominican Republic follows its present course, I am moderately hopeful that ten years from now it will have made more economic and political progress than Cuba, which is proceeding by violent revolution and totalitarian controls.

I do not think that clichés about the United Fruit Company, military dictatorships, and what 200 million Latin Americans may or may not think are particularly helpful in illuminating events on that continent. There would seem to be four possibilities: unjust, feudal regimes such as exist in Peru and Colombia; reformist governments such as are now in power in Venezuela and Chile; radical, totalitarian regimes such as Castro's Cuba, and military regimes in which the army eclectically follows various lines of policy. There could be a military government that was ideologically neutral and technocratically competent, somewhat on the model of the army regimes in Egypt and Algeria. This seems to be what the non-political army in Brazil was originally aiming at but now seems less likely to attain. There have also been army men who were populist demagogues (Peron in Argentina, Rojas in Colombia) as well as those that were simply reactionary and repressive.

If President Johnson and Lincoln Gordon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, had their choice, they would prefer to see reformist regimes (*à la* Venezuela and Chile) in power throughout Latin America, whether those governments were secular liberal or Christian Democratic in inspiration. The keenest enemies of such governments are Castro-inspired totalitarian radicals who practice terrorism and are convinced—as I am not—that democratic freedoms and economic progress cannot be reconciled. I wish that Mr. Johnson would fight harder in this country for larger sums of economic aid to Latin America, and I disagree with some secondary aspects of his policies, but on the whole he is trying to move in the right direction—that is, trying to strengthen the reformist governments, fend off the Castro-type radicals, and play by ear this country's relations with the various military regimes. Factually speaking, it is simply not true that the U.S. is "stamping out movements for progressive change."

As for Vietnam, I do not share Mr. Cox's sense of outrage because I have a different view of the American national interest and how it can best be protected. When a great power commits itself to any course of action, it cannot accept defeat lightly or change direction casually. Despite the many differences within the Communist world, both the Soviet Union and Communist China believe it to be in their interest to help the North Vietnamese to victory. Such a victory would prove that the strength of the United States could be defeated by a comparatively weak Communist state (North Vietnam) using political subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. The credibility of the United States and of its ability to protect its friends would be severely damaged. In the real world of power politics, defeats have consequences. Countries that cannot keep their word, or having tried to keep it, can be bluffed out or worn down, are countries that have less influence in the next showdown.

Now that does not mean that the United States has to conquer North Vietnam or that it can settle for nothing less than a clearcut victory. A compromise is conceivable.

When President Johnson decided in 1965 to send American troops to South Vietnam in large numbers, he faced the same kind of decision as President Roosevelt faced in 1940-41 when he moved to block further Japanese expansion in Asia and as President Truman faced in 1950 when he intervened to save South Korea. In each instance, the consequences were the same: war, casualties, a difficult struggle. But in each instance, the President and a majority of the American people concluded that it was not in the American interest to permit hostile forces to impose their will in Asia. I do not believe historians in the future will judge Lyndon B. Johnson adversely because he, too, decided to commit American power and prestige in Asia. WILLIAM V. SHANNON

NO ESCAPE

THE SCREEN

With all the new releases on our screens, this turns out to be a something-for-everybody week. And interestingly enough, the most thoughtful of the lot is a 1955 Japanese film that was shown here at the Museum of Modern Art during the 1963 New York Film Festival and then seemed to have disappeared. Perhaps distributors felt it was too frightening and grim for American audiences. Fortunately Brandon Films is now releasing this rewarding and provocative movie that covers a universal and timely theme. Although "I Live in Fear" is not my favorite of the pictures made by Akira Kurosawa (I prefer "Rashomon," "Ikiru," "Throne of Blood," and "Seven Samurai") it is still outstanding artistically and thematically, and it deserves the attention it is bound to win.

Alarming and harsh "I Live in Fear" may be, but it is also stirring and warmly human as Kurosawa tells this story of a self-made, successful Tokyo foundryman now

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in his sixties, with a lot of money, a large family, and an overwhelming fear of A-bombs, H-bombs, and, remembering 1945, radioactivity. When he learns that northern Japan, where he's building a bomb-proof shelter, is not safe from atomic dust, he decides to emigrate with his whole family to Brazil. But his money-minded family, aware that they could not move their prosperous foundry to South America, take a dim view of all this—including their father's obsessive fears. They drag him into family court and finally succeed in having him declared mentally incompetent. The frustrated, once-powerful man gathers his family and even his mistresses and their children and pleads that they fly with him to Brazil.

Toshiro Mifune, who has starred in several Kurosawa films, is magnificent in this lead role as the stern-but-loving father, the hard-working big shot who made a fortune that is no longer at his disposal, the man who wants to save not only his family but also his workers and perhaps all mankind from atomic madness. Kurosawa's direction is first-rate—in Mifune's scenes and in the sequences in court and those in which the man's sons and daughters bicker about who who will get what when he dies, and those in which the mistresses struggle to get their children recognized before *their* father dies. But it isn't all fight for self. There are many displays of love between this father and his large family. And one of the most interesting characters in "I Live in Fear" is an outsider (very well played by Takashi Shimura) who serves in the family court and is greatly moved by the aging man's fears and pitiful cry: "I can't help dying some day, but I don't want to be killed." Although "I Live in Fear" is too long, especially for a film that harps on one note, it deserves several rounds of applause for never mentioning the evils of atomic bombs—in warfare and in testing—and for portraying a family that could be a family anywhere in the so-called civilized world. Perhaps a movie like this does twice as much good with its universal story than does a film like the forthcoming "The War Games" which shows the horrors of the next war in such a way that one can hardly stand looking at it—and most people won't. When the father finds peace at last in an asylum at the end of "Fear," the doctor asks: "Is he insane or am I the lunatic?" So might we all ask.

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Even movie-goers who are still keen about the spy-and-chase cycle will recognize that "Kiss the Girls and Make Them Die" is another dud that should help bring the cycle to a conclusion. Its plot, in which agents Michael Connors and Dorothy Provine pursue Raf Vallone who plans to sterilize the whole world, is neither funny nor interesting. And as a spy spoof, this sad little mess isn't even cinematically lively.

But then again, just to prove that the secret-agent trend hasn't gone completely to the dogs yet, there's "The Deadly Affair," a fascinating and suspenseful thriller in which a British Home Office agent plays the hero. Since Paul Dehn based his script on John le Carré's *Call for the Dead,* this hero, like Le Carré's "Spy Who Came in from the Cold," isn't exactly heroic in the epic sense. He's a middle-aged, quiet man, saddled with a nymphomaniac wife (Harriet Andersson) whom he loves and puts up with and somehow muddles along in his middle-class home. But as a detective, he's on his toes, and in his investigation to prove that the death of a Foreign Office man is murder and not suicide, he pursues clues that lead from one thrilling chase to the next. Producer-director Sidney Lumet has made "The Deadly Affair" more than just another secret agent movie. James Mason is first-rate in the lead, and the cast throughout, including Simone Signoret, Maximilian Schell, Harry Andrews, are fine. The Royal Shakespeare Company, doing a scene from Marlowe's "Edward II," provide a brilliant counterpoint during the film's climax.

If audiences don't expect "Hotel" to have quite the grand flair of the 1932 Garbo-Barrymores "Grand Hotel," they'll have a pretty good time at this new multi-star opus based on Arthur Hailey's novel. It collects a lot of people in this aristocratic but fading hotel in New Orleans and lets them go to work on each other: Melvyn Douglas as the aging, sad owner; Rod Taylor as the manager; Kevin McCarthy as a young tycoon who wants to add this hotel to his chain; Catherine Spaak as McCarthy's mistress who is set to work on Taylor; Karl Malden as a thief who flits from room to room; Richard Conte as the house dick who's blackmailing a couple of titled guests (Michael Rennie and Merle Oberon); etc., etc. Director Quine keeps his good cast moving at such a fast pace you hardly have time to consider how silly and contrived much of the plot is. But you won't be bored at your visit to this hotel—even if it isn't grand.

For athletes, and perhaps even for those who just confine their sports to watching, "Goal!" should provide a real treat. It is an expertly made British documentary showing events at the World Cup soccer competition in

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England last July. The camera work (in color) is superb; and while the games may be a bit hard to follow at first, you soon get wise to what's going on (with the help of a narrator) and eventually you even become familiar with some of the players. This excellent documentary doesn't neglect the spectators, and before the film runs its lively course, you wish you were among them. However, you probably see the whole thing better from a theater seat than if you were actually in the various stadiums. You may even find yourself cheering winners and losers.

PHILIP T. HARTUNG

SOUP TO NUTS

THE STAGE

Vasek Simek, director of "The Wicked Cooks," has informed the public that the wicked cooks of the play by Günter Grass are nothing more or less than wicked cooks, no allegory intended. Simek has this on no less authority than the playwright, the German novelist of *Tin Drum* and *Cat and Mouse* fame. This piece of information is valuable for anyone attending a performance of the play since the temptation to impose an allegorical interpretation is nearly irresistible. The play is having its world premiere in this English-language, off-Broadway production which has been meticulously mounted and energetically directed by Mr. Simek.

The plot concerns the machinations of a gang of cooks —and a rival gang of what I took to be butchers but were apparently more cooks—to wrest the secret of a soup recipe from a gentleman known as the Count. Little seems to be known of this soup except that it is of a greyish color, whether from an admixture of dirt or ashes is not certain. Why the Count has the recipe or why anyone else would want it is not explained. The methods of the cooks in their attempts to get the secret from the Count range from cajolery and bribery to torture. The youngest and most personable of the cooks, Stephen, known also as Vasco, is the most enterprising of the gang. He finally turns over his fiancée, Martha, a nurse, to the Count in an attempted exchange for the secret recipe. But Martha and the Count find love and courage together and in the ultimate showdown commit suicide rather than relinquish the recipe—if indeed the Count really remembered it.

There are a number of tantalizingly allegorical suggestions along the way. The leader of the cooks is the one with the trumpet. Stephen's aunt, who urges the salvation of prayer, dies and reappears as the proprietress of a laundry where the cooks meet to conspire. When they are foiled at last the cooks celebrate a mock Mass and Stephen himself ends the play in what seems to be an attitude of genuine prayer.

This Kafkaesque nightmare certainly does not lend itself to easy interpretation. It has been suggested that the cooks represent the Nazis but where the reading goes from there is hard to say. Certainly if they are Nazis, Grass' attitude toward the movement is one of the most ambiguous on record and nothing like his soberer statements. The Kafka analogy is perhaps the closest thing to a solution. The story is, as in Kafka, a sort of dream allegory which stirs its resonances—if any—in the subconscious rather than in the literal world of one-for-one correspondences. The instructive point, however, is that Grass does not set in motion those echoes of meaning which Kafka does. We can identify with K. even in our bewilderment as we read *The Trial* or *The Castle* but in "The Wicked Cooks" we have only bewilderment—or, what is worse, tedium.

Amid generally good performances is a notable one by Martin Sheen as Stephen-Vasco who manages to be subtle and back-breakingly athletic in his role. Günter Grass fans will probably have to see this one fairly soon. Even if the play lasts, Mr. Sheen may not. (*At the Orpheum.*)

The front-page headline on the New York *Post* the day after the opening of "Come Live with Me" read: "The

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Broadway Tragedy. Did It Have to Happen?" The story, it turned out, dealt with something else but the sentiment might have applied to the review of the play as well.

"Come Live with Me" had an implausible air about it from the start of production. It was to star Soupy Sales, a comedian hitherto notable only for having a phenomenal number of custard pies thrown in his face on television children's shows. The director was to be Jonathan Miller of "Beyond the Fringe" and "Alice in Wonderland" fame. Soupy survived, but Dr. Miller dropped his directorial duties somewhere along the line as the better part of wisdom.

The play, by Lee Minoff and Stanley Price, is what used to be called a French farce, complete to all the unexpected appearances and the confusions about bedrooms. Mr. Sales is an American film-script writer living in London who takes in a blonde Danish pastry as an *au pair* housekeeper in return for English lessons. Whereupon his ex-wife shows up—and you can take it from there. There is a French pastry named Collette who nearly falls over backwards displaying her acting ability and there is a vaguely amiable English gent and a stock movie producer who wander in and out. The jokes are on the line of the suddenly arrested gesture, the double-take, and, "Just who the *hell* is Ingeborg?" Their success obviously depends more on delivery than content. Mr. Sales got no pies in his face but he did manage to spill an amazing lot of food and drink over himself. I hated myself but every time I relaxed I caught myself laughing. The laughs, however, were not numerous enough to keep the show going and it closed after four performances. (*Closed at the Billy Rose.*) WILLIAM JAMES SMITH

BOOKS

Notes from a middle-age retirement

Five Years

PAUL GOODMAN

Brussel & Brussel, $5

JOHN P. SISK

Paul Goodman's new book is a partial record of his life between his forty-fifth and fiftieth year (1955-1960). I say "partial" because it is not the autobiography of this painful time when he was "suffering from the 'nervous breakdown' of middle age retirement from [a] long and honorable career of struggling for bare acceptance." It is, rather, the transcript of the thoughts he wrote down in pocket notebooks during lonely walks along the river or in bars, or while traveling in this country or Europe. It bespeaks a man, as Harold Rosenburg puts it in his valuable introduction, "hungry for sex, for companions, for being admired, for intellectual clarity, for a classical art, for noble actions, for the absolute." The thoughts, says the author, are rooted in events too distant now to cause him embarrassment. The fact that I often found them acutely embarrassing can, I suppose, be attributed to the difference between living through an experience and watching someone else live through it.

"I went to Carthage, where I found myself in the midst of a hissing cauldron of lust," wrote the greatest of the progenitors of this kind of literature. There is much in Goodman's experience beside the lust that repeats the experience of Augustine: the love of language, the fascination with the stage, the intellectual passion, the hungering for the beautiful and the greedy enjoying of things present in pursuit of it, the discovery of oneself as a captive of insatiable appetite, the heightened awareness of the riddle of oneself, the tears of frustration and despair, the ultimate ability to say (as the saint says it): ". . . all this is past and time has healed the wound."

Further, both Augustine and Goodman came to see that they had been victims of a false religion: Augustine of Manichaeism, Goodman of the utopianism ("involving rough company, catch-as-catch can chances, and dirty practices") that drove him to link his homosexual needs to the pursuit of Paradise. Still further, both confessions are unsatisfactory to a certain kind of reader for basically the same reason: Augustine's lusts are too unspecific; Goodman's, while sufficiently specific, occupy far too little space in his book.

The great bulk of *Five Years*, in fact, displays the man one might expect to find: the Goodman of the omnivorous, flexible, subtle, witty and poetically-strung mind; the Goodman whose thoughts range passionately and acutely (and in excellent prose) over art, architecture, literary theory, city planning, personal relations, politics, philosophy, linguistics and theology. No doubt the author must be seen now as standing no less detached from these than from the gamier elements of the book, for they too are part of the way he was in the world then and frequently suffer from the same exacerbation of spirit. But at their best, which is very often, they have the quality of having been refined in fire.

Indeed, it is this very quality of the thoughts that makes the eruptions of the ugly erotomania so disconcerting—as disconcerting, I imagine, as William Hazlitt's *Liber Amoris* once proved to those who came on it unawares. That these eruptions, defined as they are against sharply contrasting interests, are equally disconcerting to the man who fills the notebooks, is part of the meaning. But the startling transitions of subject are also a manifestation *in extremis* of his ingrained conviction that the right

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way, whether in action or apprehension, is the way of violent contradiction.

This is a risk philosophy that may, with luck and grace, call forth the hero; but it is also a formula for discovering the awful precariousness of the human effort to control force. What one senses in *Five Years* is a life lived on the terrifying verge of spiritual disintegration, and the anguished tension of the effort is ultimately felt in all the thoughts, regardless of subject.

Five Years (like Faulkner's *The Wild Palms*) demonstrates that we never move closer to disaster than in our misguided attempts at Paradise. But it demonstrates too that the attempt (again, with luck and grace) need not turn out to have been entirely useless. Augustine knew this and set down the classic defense for those who would follow: "Let the proud deride me, O God, and all whom you have not yet laid low and humiliated for the salvation of their souls . . ."

Colonialism and Christian Missions

STEPHEN NEILL

McGraw-Hill, $7.95

PAUL E. SIGMUND

If the death of God took place, as it is claimed, in the nineteenth century, He has been an unconscionably long time in dying. As Kenneth S. Latourette emphasized in his *History of the Expansion of Christianity*, it was in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that Christianity became a worldwide religion with vastly more adherents more widely dispersed over the world than ever before. Not coincidentally, this expansion was contemporaneous with the extension of Western political control through the establishment of the European colonial empires, and the Indian historian, K. M. Panikkar (in *Asia and Western Dominance*) is not alone in attributing the success of Christian missionary activities to their close ideological and political relationship with Western colonialism.

In *Colonialism and Christian Missions* a former bishop of southern India, now Professor of Missions at the University of Hamburg, examines the history of the relationship of missionary activity and colonialism since the beginnings of Western expansionism and concludes, as one might expect, that the missionary record is a mixed one. Sometimes, it is true, the classic pattern was followed: "First the missionaries; then the traders; then the gunboats." More often, however, the traders or the colonial authorities actively impeded the missionary efforts for economic or political reasons. And when several powers were vying for political influence, the missionaries played a significant role in determining which of the colonial powers would triumph in the competition for colonial control.

The question of the missionary role in Western colonialism is part of the broader problem of the causes of European expansionism. The thesis of the economic origins of European imperialism put forward by Hobson and Lenin has given rise to a considerable literature ascribing it to *other* causes, including the protection of missionaries. Yet this study seems to indicate that in most cases neither the missionaries nor economic motives were particularly significant, but that European rivalries and national prestige definitely were.

Once the colonial empires had been established, the missions became intimately associated with the colonial administrations—financially, educationally, and often ideologically. The typical colonial pattern involved considerable financial assistance by the government to the mission schools which were usually the only establishments available for native education. Bishop Neill attempts to assess the advantages and disadvantages of this arrangement, noting that in at least one case, that of Indonesia, the close association of the Christian church with an inflexible and rigid Dutch colonial government helped Islam to make surprising advances even in modern times. In the Congo, on the other hand, the educational monopoly of the mission schools was decisive in producing the most heavily Catholic country in Africa.

Missionary ideological support for colonialism came from shared attitudes about European superiority which the missionaries imparted, and their desire for European-imposed peace and order in which they could carry out their work. Yet, in several instances, the missionaries' involvement in the colonial system did not prevent them from acting as a significant pressure group in favor of native rights and against colonial exploitation. Bishop Neill cites the missionary role in the suppression of the slave trade, in the establishment of Bechuanaland and Basutoland as protectorates against white South African pressures, and in the protection of African interests in Kenya against the white settlers. However paternalistic the missionaries' attitudes, they were concerned with the Africans and Asians with whom they were working, and in some cases could and did effectively mobilize opinion in the metropole on their behalf.

Since this is an academic work relying on English and German published studies rather than on on-the-spot research and interviews, it tends to emphasize the historical rather than contemporary aspects of the problem. Thus we get a history of colonialism from the time of the Greeks, and considerable emphasis on the nineteenth century with only the most superficial treatment of more recent events. When contemporary matters are discussed. Bishop Neill's personal predilections seem to influence his judgments. The rebels in the Congo in 1964 are described as "Chinese-directed" which is certainly a gross exaggeration of the minimal Chinese influence on a few leaders; the church in mainland China is praised for its attempt to work out "a genuinely Chinese form of Christianity" (whatever that is); and Catholic mission activity is rather simplistically associated with political reaction in contrast to the democratic and libertarian leadings of the Protestants.

In the concluding chapter of his survey, Bishop Neill criticizes those who would have the Church identify itself with "the forces of revolution" (a view which has recently received considerable publicity as a result of the Geneva consultation on social change sponsored by the World Council of Churches). Neill suggests that it should rather "be alert to situations" and "be wholly identified with humanity in its needs and wholly independent of it in its desires." Perhaps

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this is all that can be said on a problem that has always confronted the Church, but it provides little guidance to those who seek to apply the competing moral imperatives which they derive from the message of Christ to a complex and morally-ambiguous world. This study demonstrates that although political and economic influences and motivations played a part in the development of the missionary enterprise, one can still isolate a religious response to human needs which is independent of other variables and central to an understanding of a phenomenon which has transformed the lives of millions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Sociological Tradition

ROBERT A. NISBET

Basic Books, $7.95

PETER L. BERGER

It is intriguing that, to date, there is no history of sociological thought by an American author. There are, of course, anthologies, symposia, introductions and the like, and there are the three tomes of Howard Becker and Harry Elmer Barnes, *Social Thought from Lore to Science*, in which modern sociology appears embedded in a chain of reflections about social matters stretching back to classical antiquity. But no one in this country has yet done for the history of sociology what R. H. Lowie did for anthropology (and, indeed, it may be asked whether the European efforts have). Whatever the reasons for this, it is fair to say that in the last few years there has been a rise in scholarly interest in the sources of the sociological enterprise. Some of it has come from scholars not themselves sociologists (such as H. Stuart Hughes), some from within the field itself (as in the attempt, by a group headed by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, to produce something like a canon of sociological theories in two awe-inspiring volumes of text and commentary). Again, this is not the place to speculate on the reasons for this. Suffice it to welcome it. The same welcome should extend to the book under review here.

Robert Nisbet, himself a well-known sociologist, has had an interest in the topic before (for example, in a little volume of essays on Emile Durkheim edited by him). The present work is a stab in the same direction, this time with considerable ambition. Nisbet tries to crystallize a set of *idées-clefs* of sociological thought, determine their roots in the nineteenth century and trace their development through the "classical" period of sociology (that is, the period of Durkheim, Max Weber and Georg Simmel). The same "unit-ideas," as he calls them (a term derived from Arthur Lovejoy), are still supposed to provide the basic theoretical coordinates for the sociological enterprise today. Indeed, Nisbet feels that the latter, to remain vital, requires recurrent reflection about its theoretical origins.

Nisbet sees the roots of sociological thought in the 19th century in two related but distinct historical developments, the socio-economic transformations brought on by industrialism and the political transformations inaugurated by the French Revolution. This, of course, is not a new notion, but Nisbet's discussion of the "two revolutions" sums it up lucidly and convincingly. Sociological thought, in other words, was born of the necessity to make sense of the disintegration of the old order of pre-industrial, pre-revolutionary Europe. It goes without saying that different people found different "senses" in these events, but Nisbet suggests (very convincingly) that sociological reflection may be seen as moving between the "poles" of Marx and Tocqueville in the assessment of the new emerging world. He further suggests (and this reviewer, at any rate, agrees with him fully) that most of what has gone under the heading of "sociology" has ratified the victory of the Tocquevillean over the Marxian assessment. Put crudely, this means that sociological thought has tended to conservatism rather than revolution, to a more or less dour contemplation of the modern world rather than to a burning desire to transform it. Nisbet here shares the essential perspective of Marxist commentators on what they call "bourgeois sociology," though, of course, Nisbet does not share their negative evaluation of this characterization.

Nisbet enumerates five "unit ideas"—community, authority, status, the sacred and alienation. Each of these is coupled with a counter-idea to form five "linked antitheses" — community / society, authority/power, status/class, sacred/secular, alienation/progress. It is not difficult to see, details aside, how each of these can be traced back to the fundamental problem of the disintegration of the old order. "How is true community possible under conditions of modern industrial and urban society?"—the question is specified in Ferdinand Toennies' famous typology of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, is a virtual obsession in Durkheim's lifelong work on the nature of "solidarity," recurs in a different form in Simmel's analysis of group life. "How may one distinguish legitimate authority from the naked exercise of power?"—this question constitutes the core of Weber's political sociology and recurs under different forms in most of the other "classical" sociologists.

"Is class, as constituted in bourgeois society, the only way in which individuals may be ranked?"—the violent "no!" to this question is the normative driving force of Marxian thought, and the question becomes a key theoretical issue in the "Tocquevillean" forms of sociology. "How is one to account for the decline of traditional religion in modern society?"—albeit in very different formulations, this question is central to the work of both Durkheim and Weber. And finally—"what is the place of man, and of the *humanum* as such, in modern society?"—the question that lies at the heart of Marx's discussion of alienation and Durkheim's of "anomie," and which haunts Weber's analysis of what Nisbet aptly calls the "nemesis of rationalism."

Needless to say, it would be possible to find other "unit ideas" in the history of sociological thought (as Nisbet readily concedes). It is also possible to quarrel with the details of some of Nisbet's expositions (for example, with his rendition of the Marxian concept of alienation). The value of his argument, however, lies in showing how widely different and even discrepant trends in so-

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ciological thought may be related to each other and to a common "existential" situation. It should be emphasized that, in doing this, Nisbet does not associate himself with the position that an objective or "value-free" sociology is impossible. Rather he shows how sociologists have responded to the challenges to human self-understanding posited by the modern situation, challenges that are fundamentally normative, irrespective of the cool detachment that some of them sought and, possibly found in the sociological perspective.

He thus assists the reader in understanding sociology as a very specifically modern intellectual discipline, growing out of specifically modern circumstances —an insight, of course, that is in itself sociological! It may thus be said that what Nisbet does is to turn the lens of sociological scrutiny back upon itself. His book, at least in part, is a sociology-of-knowledge view of the knowledge of sociology. If one may make one general reproach against Nisbet, it would be that he does not seem to be sufficiently worried by the implications of this procedure —or, to put it differently, that Nisbet does not seem to be plagued by the doubt that sociology itself may be not only a product but a force of disintegration. The reproach, though, is probably unfair. A reviewer cannot fairly expect an author to share his vertigoes.

Nisbet's book, while it does not fill the gap mentioned at the outset, is a useful contribution to the growing literature about the history of sociological ideas. It will be useful to sociologists and non-sociologists alike. It will mainly annoy those who would want to see in sociology an intellectual instrument to change the world—an ambition, praiseworthy though it may be, which will find little nurture in the tradition presented in this book.

Religious Liberty

EDIT. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY

Macmillan, $4.95

AUGUSTIN P. LEONARD

Catholics may feel a little tired of commentaries on the decrees of Vatican II. But they should take heart, because as they are aptly told, the actual printed flood on the Council, and especially on freedom is only a beginning. A beginning! How late! It is rather sad that so many Catholics (John Courtney Murray is not one of them) had to wait for a Council to discover freedom so noisily. It does not say much for the depth of their faith or the fullness of their humanity up to now. Would not a little discretion in discovering something so obvious be in season?

But when a beginning is needed, and it was obviously needed in many quarters, by all means let us have it. Generally speaking the *aggiornamento* can of course produce magnificent developments or many kinds of dead ends. What is most required is serious research and creative work in order to read and to understand *in the light of faith* the signs of the times. This was already necessary before the Council, and the Council does not dispense from such work or provide a substitute for it. In so far as the texts

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

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

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of the Council (as they always do), manifest the assimilation in the whole church's consciousness of some of the best reflections and the most prophetical decisions that were going on before and in the Council, they need to be made known, understood and practiced.

The book edited by John Courtney Murray belongs rather to the secondary stage of commentary than to the prior creative phase. It probes the grounds and the content of the Declaration on Religious Freedom. Four Jesuits and five non-Catholics have contributed to the volume, which contains also the text of the Declarations clarified by interesting notes. Normally Catholics, especially if they know the adventures of the topic before and during the Council, will be more interested in the non-Catholic evaluation. It is obvious that the Declaration was not intended for internal consumption only, but also, and perhaps mostly, for the world at large. This is already clear in the sub-title: *On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious.*

John Courtney Murray, insists very much on this aspect. He comments on the decisive step between the two first schemas based on the freedom of conscience, even erroneous, and the third one, revised many times, grounded on the dignity, and therefore, the civil right of the human person. With his usual insight, clarity and scholarship, Father Murray stresses, here and elsewhere, the political-legal argument for religious freedom as distinct from the theological-moral.

This typical American argument relies rather heavily on democracy (the consensus), constitutional government, and juridical norms submitted to the inalienable rights of the citizen as a person. Would a political and social socialist state, even if necessary for the common good, conform to all those norms? The content of religious freedom is negative: immunity from coercion. Francis J. Canavan, S.J., insists even more on the political-legal side of the question. He regrets that the Council did not devote "more attention to the nature of a just political and legal order in human society." Here again there is a little doubt: in the American way?

Jerald C. Brauer in a newer fashion finds the right to religious freedom in a more personalistic and relational idea of man. The political-legal argument is of course indispensable. It was a masterful way out of the fog gathered on the problem by the conservative minority supporting the "thesis" of the Catholic state and the "hypothesis" of tolerance. Still it is doubtful that good theology and good politics are so wide apart. One wonders if a dogmatic truth does not have political consequences, through many mediations of course: so that the thesis of the Catholic State was wrong not only in political philosophy but also in theology? In one word there may be more in religious freedom than a political-legal concept and a negative content. J. V. Langmead Casserly reminds us that it is also linked with the integrity of faith and the right understanding of a God of love and freedom, and not a "God of prey" as Gabriel Marcel wrote, destroyer of the responsibility of men.

Moreover from a purely legal point of view, Victor G. Rosenblum wonders at the illusion entertained *by* the Church and theologians about the solidity of juridical norms. He recalls some disastrous events in the courts and concludes "that there be no more absolute faith placed in any other single institution." He also asks, rather pointedly, if the Council encourages Catholics to shed their blood, if necessary, for the content of Catholic faith and/or for the freedom of every man. The text is not too clear! It is also interesting to note, that in spite of the efforts of the Council and some theologians to make religious freedom a rather "secular" concept, Philip S. Denenfeld thinks that the Vatican Declaration is a declaration about religion, and not a declaration about freedom like the American Constitution. He finds many ambiguities in the text about what the Church expects from a secular state. Though there may be in the background a difference on the very notion of freedom, religious or not.

In examining religious freedom in the light of revelation, David Noel Freedman takes the wager of finding religious freedom in the Old Testament, and he wins. A most interesting point is the existence of the prophets, daringly attacking religious establishment and civil power. Though, beware of the false prophets! John L. McKenzie, S.J. deals more with the freedom of the Christian than with religious freedom. "On this complicated question, he puts forward," according to the editor, "some highly personal views." Are there no obligations for the Christian, but only love? Does not love have obligations?

Finally, George Van Massenhove, S.J., if one may borrow again the felicitous phrasing of his editor, "comments with the wisdom of simplicity on the facts of contemporary society."

The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society

WILLIAM LEE MILLER

Houghton Mifflin, $4.95

ROGER D. MASTERS

William Lee Miller has described his experiences as an alderman in New Haven, Connecticut—a city that is generally regarded, thanks to its ambitious urban renewal and anti-poverty programs, as one of the most progressive in the country. As one of his constituents, I can attest that *The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society* is an accurate description. Especially in the First Part, he catches the flavor of the door-to-door canvass, the ward Democratic committee meetings, and the angry neighborhood hearings over bussing and public housing. Although the style is not always up to the wit and incisiveness of his *Piety Along the Potomac*, which exploded the pompous moralism of the Eisenhower years, this is solid and illuminating journalism.

The book is a personal memoir of the two years since William Miller first decided to run for alderman in 1963, during which the main local controversies focused on a bussing plan to achieve racial balance in the schools and an attempt to scatter public housing in a middle-class neighborhood. In both cases, a forward-looking city government stirred up resentment from those who thought that the neighborhood school, their

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property values, and their children's welfare were threatened. The last half of the book concentrates on the less explosive story of urban renewal and anti-poverty programs in New Haven, concluding with the 1965 city election in which the Democratic party for the first time took all 33 seats on the board of Aldermen (the strongest Republican showing being in the Fifteenth Ward, where Miller was the only Democratic incumbent in a tight race).

Although the book provides a balanced assessment of local pressures and conflicts, the analysis of the way these events reflect national issues can be questioned. For example, so-called white backlash is undoubtedly a serious problem for the Democratic party today, but I wonder whether the uproar over bussing and scattered housing in New Haven's Fifteenth Ward were "disastrous" or even deplorable. Insofar as resentment "had pretty much faded away" by the 1965 city elections, the bitter conflict could well have been a safety valve. Shouting matches and vindictiveness revealed, after all, that the city government was trying to deal with *de facto* segregation and poverty. And perhaps the realization of this fact explains why, for the last three summers, New Haven has not had any serious rioting. In this, as in many other aspects, the city need not be a model for urban politics across the nation because we have profited from over a decade of enlightened and aggressive leadership under Mayor Richard Lee.

Miller's optimistic views of LBJ's programs, based primarily on the single favorable example of New Haven, are debatable too. The city has had far more than its per capita share of Federal renewal and war on poverty funds, yet everything is not quite as rosy as might appear from *The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society*. Some who have had close contact with Community Progress Inc., the local anti-poverty agency, have not always been impressed with every facet of its operations. Reports of success have sometimes outrun the activities themselves. Central headquarters have often swallowed effective neighborhood staff, and the follow-through has not always been as glowing as the statistics.

The anti-poverty program has not been a failure in New Haven—far from it. But if, in this city of 150,000, blessed with a progressive mayor, bureaucratic tangles and official paternalism have been a problem, will they not be insuperable obstacles elsewhere? And if all cities had access to the kind of funding enjoyed in New Haven, what would the total cost be? Would it be much less than a guaranteed annual income? Such alternatives aren't discussed in Miller's book.

At some point, we may face a clear choice; either a proliferation of anti-poverty efforts, each with local opposition and hobbled by administrative difficulties, or a basic national incomes policy that could radically alter the structure of poverty. When confronted with this choice, one CPI worker confidently predicted: "We'll have both." He may be right for New Haven, because a pilot income-maintenance program is rumored to be on the way. But given the costs of imitating New Haven's progress throughout the country, perhaps we will have to choose—and if so, I'd probably prefer a guaranteed income to break the despair that still grips our inner cities.

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rected or deposed and turned out of the Church. And so with a layman." Alfons Auer has taken the words of this ancient canon to heart and written a very sensible book to correct those clerics and laymen who would inveigh against Creation in the name of its Creator. The volume is divided into three sections. In the first, Auer investigates the resources of lay spirituality in the early church, middle ages and modern times. In the second, he considers the theological foundations for a proper doctrine of lay spirituality; and finally, he considers the specific modern problems of technology, marriage and politics.

In the historical section, Auer is able to produce judicious words from fathers and doctors of the Church which show an awareness of the problem of the laymen in the world. There is a grudging appreciation of the laity when St. John Chrysostom wonders "how the man who is weighed down by worldly cares, bound by so many fetters and constantly chained to an ill-tempered wife [can] scale the heights of heaven?" By and large, however, traditional piety has been clerically oriented and Auer sees it as the task of the Church after Vatican II to lay down guidelines for a new "worldly" spirituality. To this end, he makes good use of the traditional doctrines of Creation, Sin and Incarnation, emphasizing again the vast difference between Platonic piety which views the world as mere appearance and Christian piety which finds its God fundamentally immersed in human history. Incarnational theology calls for the saving transformation of the world of technology, sexuality and democracy which Auer examines in his final section.

In all these areas Auer is eminently sensible. I think I agree with almost every point he makes, but my ultimate impression of the book is one of frustration and futility. A friend recounted to me recently his experiences working for a super-secret government organization. In security cases an elaborate dossier is prepared and kept up-to-date. Entries are made of various bits of information. Rumors, suspicions, hints and even hard fact are mixed in for possible use *in extremis*. As the years wear on the dossier thickens and new officers entering the agency review the folder with an eye to summing up its contents. Later entries are impressive in their documentation and prudent evaluations. But the documentation is all internal, going back over the original uncorroborated entries and drawing them together in a vast apparatus of scholarship that lends credibility of form to the dubiousness of content.

"The Commonweal Papers"

Copies of the widely discussed February 10 issue on the present-day Problem of God, the first of "The Commonweal Papers," are now available for individual and classroom orders. This challenging issue contains:

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And now suppose someone were to question the truth value of the summation—does it relate to the real world? Of course, why we can go back over the material to show that it was all intended to be about the real world. All the bits and pieces are statements *about* something out there. Doesn't this item sound plausible, definitely believable? But, alas, it is now too late to get an independent check in the world outside the assemblage in the dossier. The case rests on consistency, not fact.

Auer's entire work is cast within a circle of theological assumptions and, more particularly, a heavy traditional religious rhetoric. If you live inside that language and want to know whether the language points to a world outside, then Auer's case is useful and persuasive. I would think, however, that the problem of the day is not whether the Church is open to the world but whether the world is open to God. For the most of us there is scarcely any more need to rest the reality of the world on the theological consequences of Incarnation than there would be to check our own reality by referring to our government dossier. We know that there are people engaged in such arcane goings-on and we may be cheered to know that they, too, regard our world as really there, but it hardly needs their sanction to continue. The fact of the matter is that "God-talk" seems to have very little function in our day—whether it is used to prove the reality or the *un*-reality of the world as we experience it.

Auer quotes G. Thils on the implications that can be drawn from the speculation about the "refined and powerfully 'pneumatic' bodies" of the blessed. A strong Christian emphasis on the resurrected body certainly suggests a positive attitude toward the world and the work of man's hands, but I feel that the language only leads to embarrassed laughter. The other ponderous theological paraphernalia are not so amusing but seem equally difficult to relate to the experience of the worldly. The old ascetic and monkish traditions of spirituality at least had the virtue of annoying or scandalizing men of affairs. I am afraid that theology of the world is likely to seem like excess baggage.

Auer is an author of great goodwill who had written a book filled with humane wisdom and much honest work. (I do hope that someday spiritual writers will drop the imperative mood. I noted on p. 261, seven "must's" and a "should.") I am sorry to say that I do not think that it fulfills any clear need. It lacks the theological and philosophical depth which would persuade those not already persuaded, and its traditional rhetoric will leave the common man untouched. The world is not waiting, I am afraid, for the Church's blessing. How is theology of the world to avoid the faintly comic air of San Salvador finally deciding to recognize the Soviet Union?

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 547)

ment or to violate it whenever necessary. As a result, American pressure for a treaty of this kind is bound to alienate those Europeans who believe that Russo-American agreements amount to a superpower condominium that places the continent in a perpetual status of inferiority.

I've written the above especially because I am increasingly amazed at the extent to which observers and policymakers alike are ignoring Western Europe. The President managed exactly one sentence on NATO in his State of the Union address—a fact that will not be lost in Bonn and Rome as well as Paris and London.

ROGER D. MASTERS

Aid to Catholic Colleges

Collegeville, Minn,

To the Editors: It is not easy for someone who so much enjoys and appreciates the views James O'Gara brings his *Commonweal* readers, to take the critic's part. Nevertheless, after pondering his discussion (January 27) on the meaning of the recent Maryland case for the continued granting of public tax monies to Catholic colleges, I feel inclined to do so.

Mr. O'Gara would appear to rest his case that First Amendment guarantees are not violated when Catholic colleges are included in state-aid programs on the proposition that "the no-establishment clause must be balanced with the freedom-of-exercise clause." Yet his terminology for Catholic colleges—"Roman Catholic institutions . . . non-public colleges . . . religiously-related schools . . . private colleges . . . colleges operated under religious auspices . . . colleges with religion in the curriculum . . . religiously-oriented schools . . . non-profit . . . church-related" etc.—shows, I believe, how easy it becomes to lose one's way in the thicket of Catholic academia. This last, by the way, is a bit of sociological jargon that I take to mean something that doesn't exist but would be awfully nice if it did! It is the sort of term one uses easily after visiting, as I was fortunate enough to do with Rev. Andrew Greeley last year, the campuses of some thirty Catholic colleges.

As the legislatures and the courts have long recognized, the self-regulation of an enterprise when masked by a litany of slogans which seek to associate its mechanics and aims with the public welfare has an appeal that is difficult but possible to contradict. From time to time we do catch a hint (as in Sen. Ribicoff's investigation of the auto makers or the late Sen. Kefauver's inquiries into drug manufacturing)that labels often conceal more than they explain.

The real burden resting with those who read the Maryland case with concern is to describe and offer evidence for the similarities they believe exist between a given Catholic and other types of colleges. If credible resemblances in sufficient amounts can be discovered, the net residue may possibly be labelled a college's "Catholic" component. That too, of course, may be studied with interest and profit. Were this to be done it would be my guess that a fair number of Roman Catholic colleges would turn out to be neither colleges nor Catholic. To continue to hail them as such reduces the likelihood that the genuine ones will receive the support from the public sector they clearly should have.

Misbranding is a great disservice to the young as well as to the Church that depends on them for its growth.

WILLIAM J. VAN CLEVE
St. John's University

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To the Occasional Reader

You will find in this February 17 issue a cross section of the informative and pertinent material which, week in week out, Commonweal publishes—as well as a good sampling of the type of authors who regularly appear in these pages.

To further indicate to you the range and scope of this lay-edited journal, here are a few of the articles scheduled to appear in Commonweal in coming weeks:

Edward T. Chase—*Medicare-Medicaid*
Bernard McCabe—*James Joyce*
Daniel Berrigan—*Cuernavaca Revisited*
John Tracy Ellis—*The Naming of Bishops*
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